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Considering Consequences: Autonomy's
Missing Half
Catherine A. Hardee*
Abstract
In a subtle but discernible trend, courts, commentators, and policymakers
increasingly use autonomy-based justzfications to support expanding economic
rights. Their use of autonomy, however, is inconsistent with the concept of
traditional liberal autonomy that proponents of economic rights embrace. This
is because many, if not most, economic choices have some measure of
consequences ameliorated by state action.
This Article exposes the conceptual incoherence of this approach and
argues that these autonomy-based arguments are invalid when they fail to
acknowledge the vital role consequences play in constituting liberal autonomy.
It also demonstrates that the failure to account for consequences in determining
the value of a choice creates conceptual and practical problems that can
unnecessarily hamper effective regulations while simultaneously undervaluing
true autonomy. To do so, this Article uses the Supreme Court's landmark
NFB v. Sebelius decision and the debate over privatizing Social Security as
case studies to critique autonomy-based arguments used to justify economic
rights in circumstances where consequences are artificially constrained. This
Article then provides an alternative consequence-focused framework for
evaluating the regulation of such choices. Finally, this Article applies that
framework to demonstrate that considering consequences helps ensure a more
robust protection of true autonomy while still providing policymakers flexibility
to address social issues.
* Assistant Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. My thanks to the members of
the Tulane University Law School Intellectual Life and Junior Faculty Brownbag Workshops and the
Cumberland Works-in-Progress Workshop for their insights. Special thanks to Brannon Denning, Adam
Feibelman, Sam Matambanadzo, Shu-Yi Oei, Sally Richardson, Amy Stein, Kristen van de Biezenbos,
Melissa J. Durkee, and Anna VanCleave for their invaluable comments on this paper.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A growing libertarian political movement uses arguments rooted in
individual autonomy to advocate for decreased government regulation and
increased economic rights.' Some legal commentators and courts have
embraced these autonomy arguments, most notably five members of the
Supreme Court in NFIB v. Sebelius.2 Despite upholding the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act's (Affordable Care Act or ACA) individual mandate
as a valid exercise of Congress's tax power, a majority of the Court in NFIB
agreed that the mandate exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause.4 The majority concluded that individuals have an economic liberty
1. Proponents of economic rights define them as "the right to acquire, use, and possess private
property and the right to enter into private contracts of one's choosing." Randy E. Barnett, Does the
Constitution Protect Economic Liberty?, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5, 5 (2012).
2. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
3. Id. at 2594.
4. Id. at 2587. The Commerce Clause majority consists of the Chief Justice writing for himself, id.
at 2577, and a separate opinion written by Justice Scalia that was joined by Justices Alito, Kennedy, and
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interest under the Commerce Clause to choose not to purchase health insurance,
and that this economic right trumps Congress's decision to require individuals
to purchase health insurance as a means of supporting the health insurance
market.'
Autonomy, also called liberty or the right to be left alone, is a value found
at the core of much legal thinking on the Constitution, rights, and the limits of
government power.6 The concept has also played a central role in courts' and
commentators' conceptions of individual rights. It is not surprising, therefore,
that in a contest of autonomy versus regulation, autonomy frequently prevails.
Under a theory of liberal autonomy, individuals have the ability to
deliberatively form and pursue their own conception of the good.9
Consequences are an important aspect of liberal autonomy as consequences
provide individuals with the data necessary to deliberate on what constitutes
"the good."10 They also act as an internal risk regulator that allows for
Thomas, id at 2642 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Chief Justice's opinion upholding the mandate under
the tax power was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Breyer. Id. at 2609 (majority
opinion).
5. Id. at 2591; id. at 2648 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Ronald Kahn, The Commerce Clause and
Executive Power: Exploring Nascent Individual Rights in National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius, 73 MD. L. REv. 133, 177 (2013).
6. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Should We All Be Welfare Economists?, 101 MICH. L. REv. 979, 990
(2003) ("Autonomy is a value of foundational moral importance."); James E. Fleming, Securing
Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1, 3 (1995) (arguing that autonomy is one of "two bedrock
structures of our constitutional document" and "guaranteed status of free and equal citizenship in our
morally pluralistic constitutional democracy"); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Counting the Dragon 's Teeth
and Claws: The Definition ofHard Paternalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 663 (2004) ("As a matter of
social, political, and moral fact, our culture places a high value on autonomy.").
7. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) ("Liberty presumes an autonomy of self
that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct."); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("[C]hoices central to personal dignity and autonomy,
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."); Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[The Founders] conferred, as against the government,
the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men."); see also Rogers M. Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60 TEX. L. REV. 175, 186-92 (1982)
(documenting "rise of autonomy as a fundamental value" supporting personal rights).
8. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (noting that "[a]s the Constitution endures, persons in every
generation can invoke [the Due Process Clause's] principles in their own search for greater freedom").
9. See Randy E. Barnett, Afterword: The Libertarian Middle Way, 16 CHAP. L. REv. 349, 364
(2013) (noting that libertarians' primary end is "the pursuit of the good life," which requires individuals
to take their own path as "living the good life is a do-it-yourself affair"); Jedediah Purdy & Neil S.
Siegel, The Liberty of Free Riders: The Minimum Coverage Provisions, Mill's "Harm Principle," and
American Social Morality, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 374, 377-79, 383-84 (2012) (describing libertarian
critiques of ACA and connecting them to the liberal autonomy of John Stuart Mill).
10. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 48-49 (Dover Thrift 2002) (1859).
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experimentation without government intervention." Given the role of
consequences in liberal autonomy, whenever a state-provided safety net or
other protection exists that removes a significant measure of consequences
from the equation, what is left is something less than full autonomy. In such
situations, individuals are in fact protected from the most extreme
consequences of freely made choices.1 2 Not surprisingly though, the mitigation
of consequences, even for those who have meaningful choice, is inevitable as
society is generally unwilling to let its members suffer the worst consequences
of poor decision making, such as death, disability, or lifelong crippling debt.13
Proponents of economic liberty, who came out in full force against the
individual mandate, argue for a theory of liberal autonomy that emphasizes
individual self-determination.1 4 This theory of autonomy was employed by the
majority of the Supreme Court in their Commerce Clause opinions in NFIB v.
Sebelius."
If NFIB is an indication that the Court is moving toward protecting
economic rights based on a theory of liberal autonomy, it is crucial that the
Court be concerned with whether the liberty interest identified is consistent
with their own conception of autonomy. Before utilizing autonomy to trump
legislative mandates in favor of a theory of economic rights, the Court should
formulate a coherent theory of autonomy that justifies trumping the political
will of the elected branches. Without it, the Court runs the risk of repeating the
mistakes of the Lochner era. Commentators have debated many aspects of the
NFIB decision, such as whether the liberty interest identified by the majority
11. See id. at 10 (stating autonomy "requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our
life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow. . . .");
id. at 48-49 (describing ability to experiment and "gather materials for decision" as necessary to choose
one's own path); see also Fleming, supra note 6, at 18 (explaining "the capacity to form, revise, and
rationally pursue a conception of the good" is a component of autonomy).
12. See infra Part II.D.
13. See infra Part IV.A.
14. See Bryan J. Leitch, Where Law Meets Politics: Freedom of Contract, Federalism, and the Fight
over Health Care, 27 J.L. & POL. 177, 189-90 (2011) (drawing parallel between individualism "in the
classical libertarian sense" of Lochner era of economic rights and ACA opponents' arguments for
economic and individual liberty). One of the architects of the legal challenge to the ACA was
Georgetown law professor and noted libertarian legal scholar Randy Barnett. See Randy E. Barnett, No
Small Feat: Who Won the Health Care Case (and Why Did So Many Law Professors Miss the Boat)?, 65
FLA. L. REv. 1331, 1332 (2013).
15. See Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, to Spend, to Regulate, 126 HARv. L. REv. 83, 104 (2012)
(describing Commerce Clause arguments made by the majority as "libertarian at their core"); see also
infra Parts IL.B, III.B.
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was in fact substantive due process in disguise; 6 whether the Court's
federalism reasoning supports finding an individual right;1 7 and whether the
harm caused by the uninsured should outweigh such a liberty interest." But no
one has yet addressed whether the liberty interest the majority in NFIB sought
to protect is consistent with the theory of liberal autonomy advanced by
proponents of economic rights. Given the power that the concept of autonomy
wields and its use as the driving force behind expanding economic liberty, it is
crucial that the label "autonomy" not be used to trump the regulation of choices
that are less than fully autonomous.
This Article argues that proponents of economic rights-such as the right
implicated in NFIB-employ a simplistic view of liberty that does not comport
with the traditional theory of liberal autonomy, which the same proponents
utilize, because many consequences, including the most drastic consequences,
are removed from the decision-making process. 9 When the consequences of a
freely made choice are removed by government action-such as the state safety
nets in place that provide a basic level of health care for those who choose not
to purchase insurance-the autonomy interest in the remaining choice is
incomplete and less deserving of protection.20
This Article develops a framework that is useful for evaluating autonomy-
based arguments that, in fact, relate to choices that lack some measure of
consequences. I call this framework "proportionalism" and explain how it is
both intellectually consistent and useful because it allows policymakers
adequate flexibility to efficiently address moral hazard that can be created when
consequences are removed.2 ' In addition, this framework better respects
autonomy by focusing the inquiry on the autonomy of the decision maker rather
16. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Commerce, Death Panels, and Broccoli: Or Why the
Activity/Inactivity Distinction in the Health Care Case Was Really About the Right to Bodily Integrity,
29 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 897 (2013); Kahn, supra note 5, 149-53.
17. See, e.g., Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers ofArticle I, 123 YALE L.J. 2044 (2014); Mark
D. Rosen & Christopher W. Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles and Popular
Constitutionalism in the Health Care Case, 61 UCLA L. REV. 66, 124 (2013).
18. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Uncertainty and the Design of
Social Insurance: Reflections on the Obamacare Case, 7 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 343, 347 (2013). See
generally Purdy & Siegel, supra note 9.
19. See infra Part III.A.
20. See infra Part III.B.
21. Moral hazard occurs when a party fails to take steps to minimize the possibility of harm because
it does not bear the risk of loss. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99
HARV. L. REV. 509, 537 (1986). See generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75
TEX. L. REv. 237 (1996).
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than the diffused interests of taxpayers.2 2 Proportionalism prevents arguments
in favor of incomplete liberty from trumping political efforts to increase social
welfare while at the same time ensuring that true autonomy is given appropriate
consideration in the political process. Increased calls for both stronger social
safety nets and more respect for individual autonomy make this framework
critical for balancing these, at times, competing concerns.23
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II surveys the autonomy
arguments used to support economic rights, including popular opposition to the
individual mandate and the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB v. Sebelius. It
demonstrates that both these autonomy arguments and the majority's reasoning
in NFIB employ a theory of liberal autonomy based on individual self-
determination. Part III discusses the role that consequences play in this theory
of liberal autonomy, illustrating that role with arguments in favor of privatizing
Social Security. Part III then examines the choice to purchase health insurance
and critiques arguments for economic rights based on liberal autonomy.
Finally, Part IV examines the conceptual and practical problems that arise when
choices lacking in consequences are conflated with full autonomy. Part IV
suggests the "proportionalism" framework, which lawmakers and jurists may
use to consider choices involving incomplete liberty. This Part offers concerns
about health and dietary choices as an example. This Article concludes by
identifying other areas of law and policymaking where this framework may be
particularly useful.
II. AUTONOMY AND EcoNOMIC RIGHTS
There is a growing political movement in the United States that embraces
conceptions of individual autonomy or liberty to argue for freedom from
government interference, especially in the realm of economic rights.24  This
movement has found support in the law from politicians, legal commentators,
and the judiciary.25  The ongoing legal and political challenges to the
22. See infra Part IV.B.
23. See generally Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 18 (outlining need for reform of social insurance
programs, including savings mandates, due to changing societal needs).
24. See Randy Barnett, The Tea Party, the Constitution, and the Repeal Amendment, 105 Nw. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 281 (2011) (describing Tea Party movement); Rosen & Schmidt, supra note 17, at
129-31 (noting rise of libertarian movement and ideology's increased viability in mainstream politics
and legal discourse); Robert Draper, Has the 'Libertarian Moment' Finally Arrived?, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/10/magazine/has-the-libertarian-moment-
finally-arrived.html?_r-0 (describing rise of libertarian movement and ideology on American politics).
25. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 1, at 7 (arguing Constitution supports broad economic rights);
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Affordable Care Act's individual mandate have become a major battleground
for the issue. 26 Questions of liberty and economic rights took center stage for
months of political and legal debate culminating in the Supreme Court's
decision in NFIB v. Sebelius.27 In NFIB, a majority of the Court used
arguments in favor of personal autonomy and economic liberty to craft an
individual right under the Commerce Clause. 28 Despite justifying the right on
federalism concerns, the majority uses the language of liberal autonomy to
justify this new economic right.29
A. The Rhetoric ofLiberty
Autonomy or liberty has long held great moral and rhetorical force in
policy arguments regarding the proper limits of government regulation. 0
"[O]ur political system rejects the notion of an objectively definable 'good
life,' [and thus] the right to self-determination has become the preeminent value
in the United States."3 1
In recent years, as libertarian ideas have grown more politically popular,
autonomy has been used more frequently as the basis to argue for economic
rights. The Tea Party movement has been a populous, if extreme, branch of
James W. Ely Jr., The Constitution and Economic Liberty, 35 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 27, 35 (2012)
(arguing that Constitution "assigns a high value to property and contractual rights"); see also Graetz &
Mashaw, supra note 18, at 344-46 (describing support for liberal autonomy by five Justices in NFIB v.
Sebelius); Draper, supra note 24 (describing political support for libertarian positions from mainstream
politicians).
26. See Rosen & Schmidt, supra note 17, at 130-31.
27. See Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 18, at 104-05, 113-14, 117-18 (describing debate leading up
to NFIB).
28. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
29. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
30. See Fallon, supra note 6, at 990 ("Autonomy is a value of foundational moral importance.");
Pope, supra note 6, at 663 ("As a matter of social, political, and moral fact, our culture places a high
value on autonomy."); id. at 663 n.18 (citing decades of case law and legal, philosophical, and moral
commentators discussing the importance of individual autonomy to modem western culture).
31. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing Public Health Against Individual Liberty: The Ethics of
Smoking Regulations, 61 U. PITT. L. REv. 419, 474 (2000); see also David L. Shapiro, Courts,
Legislatures and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 530 (1988) (describing referendum and popular
legislative actions opposing paternalistic infringements on autonomy). This individualism is not always
beneficial to Americans. See Sabrina Tavernise, For Americans Under 50, Stark Findings on Health,
N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/10/healthlamericans-under-50-fare-poorly-
on-health-measures-new-report-says.html? r-0 (describing international study that found Americans
ranked near or at the bottom of rich countries for health and longevity outcomes, which researchers
hypothesized might be due in part to "cultural factors like individualism and dislike of government
interference").
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this movement. 32 While the Tea Party is split between strict libertarians, who
support libertarian social issues like drug decriminalization and reproductive
choice, and social conservatives, who embrace regulation in the social sphere,
they are united in their support for principles of economic autonomy, usually
expressed in terms of "liberty." 3 3 Libertarians outside the Tea Party are gaining
political momentum with a generally unified push for economic and personal
rights.3 4
This argument for economic liberty has been very forcefully and publicly
made in the public debates over the signature legislation of President Obama's
first term-The Affordable Care Act. Many on the right see the ACA,
especially the mandate that all individuals purchase health insurance (the
individual mandate), as an unprecedented intrusion into liberty that threatens
the American way of life.35 While some of the rhetoric employed by politicians
and protesters is easily dismissed,36 on the whole it speaks to deep concerns
about American individualism as seen through the lens of economic freedom.37
The rhetoric employed in the health care debate reflects an affinity for
laissez faire economic policies and theories of individual autonomy. When
32. See Rosen & Schmidt, supra note 17, at 101 (discussing rise of Tea Party movement in 2009 and
its embracing of libertarian rhetoric).
33. See Jamal Greene, What the New Deal Settled, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 265, 282 (2012) (citing
study finding Tea Party is "unified on role of government questions regarding economics and business"
but divided on social issues). "Autonomy" and "liberty" may at times reflect different meanings. See
Smith, supra note 7, at 177. Professor Smith argues that the term "autonomy" as used during the rights
revolution of the Warren Court reflected a "more relativistic stance[]" than the "higher law views" of
natural rights earlier writers attributed to "liberty." Id. However, the use of the term autonomy by
modem libertarians appears to hearken back to John Stuart Mill's use of "liberty" as individual self-
determination in On Liberty rather than a relativist "autonomy." See supra notes 10-15 and
accompanying text. The terms are used interchangeably for purposes of this Article.
34. See generally Barnett, supra note 24 (describing theoretical principles behind modem libertarian
movement); Draper, supra note 24.
35. See Leitch, supra note 14, at 183-87 (detailing popular opposition to individual mandate).
Activists are quoted as stating that the mandate "strikes at the heart of individual freedom" and "should
be offensive to all people who love liberty." Id. at 185-86; see also, Barnett, supra note 14, at 1332
(describing issue at stake in NFIB as "saving the Constitution for the country").
36. One favorite of internet commenters was the argument to "[k]eep your government hands off my
Medicare." Bob Cesca, Keep Your Goddamn Government Hands Off My Medicare, HUFFINGTON POST
(Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/bob-cesca/get-your-goddamn-governme_b_252326.
html. Sarah Palin's claims about "death panels" in the ACA was PolitiFact's inaugural "Lie of the
Year" in 2009. Angie Drobnic Holan, PolitiFact Lie of the Year: Death Panels, POLITIFACT (Dec. 18,
2009), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2009/dec/1 8/politifact-lie-year-death-panels/.
37. Barnett, supra note 24, at 282 (describing Tea Party concerns with governmental overreach, as
exemplified by individual mandate); Leitch, supra note 14, at 185-86 (describing the Tea Party
movement against mandate as defense of Constitution and individual liberty through the protection of
economic rights).
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opponents of the individual mandate refer to "autonomy" or "liberty," they
appear to be referencing a libertarian ideal of individual self-determination
heralded by liberal thinkers such as John Stuart Mill.38 Mill's position on
individual autonomy "was genuinely and deeply libertarian" and in line with
more recent arguments for economic liberty." This definition of autonomy
gives primacy to the individual's ability to make choices and experiment with
different ways of living to both further individual liberty and perfect society-
what this Article will refer to as "liberal autonomy." 40 The hallmark of liberal
autonomy is that every individual is equally autonomous and responsible for
her choices.4 '
This idea of autonomy as self-determination has made its way, in various
forms, into legal theory. Professor James Fleming tethers autonomy to the
Constitution by placing what he refers to as deliberative autonomy at the heart
of his theory of constitutional constructivism. 42  He defines autonomy as an
individual's ability to develop and exercise that capacity "in forming, revising,
and rationally pursuing their conceptions of the good." 43  In other words,
autonomy is the ability of individuals "to apply their power of deliberative
reason to deliberating about and deciding how to live their own lives.""
38. See Purdy & Siegel, supra note 9, at 387-88 (drawing parallel between libertarian position of
mandate's opponents and Mill's philosophy); Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Lochner, and the Individual
Mandate, 91 B.U. L. REv. 1723, 1742 (2011) (arguing that objection to individual mandate is "at
bottom, a libertarian objection").
39. Purdy & Siegel, supra note 9, at 383; see also Draper, supra note 24 (quoting prominent
libertarian writer and blogger as saying, "It's better to run trials and experiments, as John Stuart Mill
talked about.").
40. See MILL, supra note 10, at 10 (noting that autonomy "requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of
framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences
as may follow"); id. at 47 (noting that individual liberty is necessary for personal fulfillment and social
progress); id. at 48-49 (describing ability to experiment and "gather materials for decision" as necessary
to choose one's own path); see also Fleming, supra note 6, at 18 (noting "the capacity to form, revise,
and rationally pursue a conception of the good" is a component of autonomy).
41. See MILL, supra note 10, at 10 ("Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily,
or mental or spiritual.").
42. See generally Fleming, supra note 6. Professor Fleming's limits the scope of constitutional
protection for autonomy to only those "basic liberties that are significant preconditions" for furthering
deliberative autonomy, such as the freedom of speech. Id. at 40. He makes no claim that the
constitution protects "everyone's pursuit of individuality or autonomy in a broad sense." Id. at 43.
Nevertheless, his conception of the value of autonomy and how it operates mirrors discussions of
autonomy in the broader sense as well. Id.
43. Id. at 19; see also Fallon, supra note 6, at 1017 ("We value for ourselves, and we owe to others,
the basic liberties necessary to develop and pursue independent conceptions of choice-worthy lives.").
44. Fleming, supra note 6, at 19; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses ofAutonomy, 46 STAN.
L. REv. 875, 878 (1994) ("To be autonomous, one must be able to form a conception of the good,
793
[Vol. 43: 785, 2016] Considering Consequences
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The notion of protecting deliberative decision-making is widely held.45 In
American society, it is a guiding principle that everyone has the right to make
decisions for themselves unless the government has a good reason to impose on
their free choices.46 While the idea of autonomy is generally accepted, there is
great disagreement as to what constitutes "good reason" to infringe on
autonomy.47 Some are willing to accept broader justifications for infringing on
individual autonomy, such as hard paternalism to prevent self-harm or
redistributive programs to further other social goals.48 Others see autonomy in
less individualistic terms and argue that some restrictions of choice can actually
increase autonomy by promoting equality and removing barriers to access. 49
For ardent supporters of autonomy, such as Mill, the only legitimate
justification for infringement on this right is to prevent harm to others.0 Mill
limits this justification to harm that "violates any specific duty to the public" or
any action that "occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except
himself."5 ' All other harms "society can afford to bear, for the sake of the
greater good of human freedom."5 2 To adequately protect autonomy, the harm
principle must be carefully constrained or else it has the potential to "collapse
deliberate rationally, and act consistently with one's goals.").
45. Even those who reject theories of autonomy that prioritize the individual over recognizing the
relational aspect of autonomy still find the decision-making of individuals to be important. See
JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW'S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, AUTONOMY, AND LAW 58
(2011) (arguing that the "essence of autonomy" is the capacity to determine what influences in one's life
to embrace); see also infra Part III.C.
46. See Pope, supra note 6, at 664-67 (describing importance of autonomy in Western-American
classical liberal tradition and noting that it is widely believed that "the state should limit liberty only
when a justifiable reason for doing so exists").
47. Some argue that regulations can increase autonomy by removing consequences that reduce
individuals' "capacity to act in accord with their higher-order goals." Fallon, supra note 44, at 890
(defining theory of "descriptive autonomy"); see also Adam J. MacLeod, The Mystery of Life in the
Laboratory of Democracy: Personal Autonomy in State Law, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 589, 590 (2011)
(describing debate over acceptable limitations on autonomy).
48. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 44, at 879-93 (describing several conceptions of autonomy that
allow for differing levels of justifiable government regulation).
49. See also infra Part III.C (discussing relational autonomy). See generally NEDELSKY, supra note
45.
50. MLL, supra note 10, at 8 ("[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."); see also Pope,
supra note 31, at 435 (noting that Mill's harm principle is "the primary philosophical, political, and legal
rationale for interfering with individual autonomy").
51. MILL, supra note 10, at 69.
52. Id. Not everyone takes such a hard line on infringements to autonomy. Many embrace the idea
of self-determination but still find infringement on autonomy acceptable for at least some paternalistic or
social welfare reasons. See Fallon, supra note 44, at 883-84.
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[autonomy] to a null set." 53
The difficulty in restraining the harm principle is especially acute in
modem society where nearly every action can be said to have some effect on
others.54 Even personal behavior like wearing a motorcycle helmet or seat belt
could be justified by an expansive harm principle by invoking the cost of
accidents on family members and society.5 Any regulation that cannot be
justified under the harm principle is considered unacceptable to an ardent
supporter of autonomy. But even for those who are willing to balance
autonomy against other social goals, any regulation that cannot be justified on
the harm principle, especially paternalistic regulations, is generally viewed with
more skepticism at a policy level. 6
B. Autonomy and the Law: NFIB v. Sebelius
The libertarian popular movement shifted the debate over the ACA,
bringing the issue of individual liberty over economic choices into the legal
challenge to the mandate. Autonomy is not a new concept in the law, but the
ACA debate shifted its focus from personal rights to economic rights and led to
the Court embracing a theory of liberal autonomy to support economic rights in
53. Fallon, supra note 44, at 897; see also Pope, supra note 31, at 435 (noting that if harm to others
expands to include all "negative externalities," it "can be found in almost any type of behavior"); id. at
447 ("Theoretically, there is little, if any, individual conduct that does not 'harm' other people. The
term 'harm' is thus plagued with conceptual ambiguities that permit its expansive interpretation.").
54. "Because the harm principle provides the least controversial basis for regulation, and because
some kind of harm can always be attributed to a particular behavior, many invoke the harm principle to
'explain' regulations that would be more appropriately justified on pure paternalistic grounds." Pope,
supra note 31, at 445.
55. See id. at 436-37. Pope describes how state courts, which for years rejected motorcycle helmet
and car seatbelt laws as unjustified paternalistic regulations, eventually upheld them under the harm
principle on the theory that one's injury or death will negatively impact society. Id. He notes that the
current strategy to defeat autonomy claims is to "illustrat[e] that seemingly personal behavior does in
fact violate the harm principle and is therefore subject to societal control." Id. at 437.
56. See Stephen A. McGuinness, Time to Cut the Fat: The Case for Government Anti-Obesity
Legislation, 25 J.L. & HEALTH 41, 50-51 (2012) (describing and responding to objections to
paternalistic regulations); Pope, supra note 31, at 427-28 (describing "liberty limiting principles" that
can justify infringements on autonomy, including the harm principle and soft and hard paternalism). Not
all theories of autonomy are as suspicious of paternalistic interventions. See also infra Part II.C
(discussing relational autonomy).
57. See Rosen & Schmidt, supra note 17, at 114-15 (describing how individual liberty argument
made its way into court battle over the ACA despite federalism rationale relied on by Court). Rosen and
Schmidt trace the "broccoli horrible"-the Chief Justice's argument that the mandate could lead to
forced vegetable purchases-from popular discourse to the Supreme Court. Id.; see also Leitch, supra
note 14, at 198-99 (noting how social movements can alter interpretations of constitutional norms).
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a way not seen since before the New Deal.
Although there is no constitutional "right to autonomy" in the United
States, it has been identified as animating several fundamental rights, such as
freedom of speech and religion, privacy, and the right to contraception and
abortion. 9 Legal commentators have long recognized the importance of the
concept of autonomy and grappled with the role conceptions of self-
determination or liberty do (or should) play in the law.60  Beginning in the
Warren and Burger Courts, the notion of autonomy drove the development of
personal rights, such as the right to privacy.61
Prior to the Warren era, notions of economic liberty had been used to
support economic rights, most infamously in Lochner v. New York,62 but such
arguments fell out of favor following the New Deal.63 In recent years, some
academic commentators have begun heralding autonomy-based justifications
for economic freedom that are in line with popular libertarian rhetoric, going so
far as to question whether the Lochner-era decisions regarding freedom of
contract have been incorrectly vilified.64
The lead up to the Court's review of the individual mandate saw a number
58. See Leitch, supra note 14, at 199 (arguing that Tea Party was "moving to normalize and
legitimize discussion of economic substantive due process in contemporary legal argument through
persistent iteration of their political values").
59. See Fleming, supra note 6, at 45 (arguing constitutional constructivism does not protect a
"comprehensive libertarian principle of autonomy"); Shapiro, supra note 31, at 543-44 (discussing
liberty-based arguments in First Amendment scholarship and doctrine); Smith, supra note 7, at 185-92
(tracing use of autonomy in Supreme Court precedent).
60. See Fallon, supra note 6, at 990 ("Autonomy is a value of foundational moral importance.");
Fleming, supra note 6, at 18-19 (placing deliberative autonomy at center of his theory of constitutional
constructivism). See generally NEDELSKY, supra note 45; Fallon, supra note 44; Smith, supra note 7.
61. Smith, supra note 7, at 186, 189 (describing history of autonomy in Supreme Court); see, e.g.,
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) ("Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct."); Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("[C]hoices central to personal dignity and autonomy[] are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
62. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
63. See Greene, supra note 33, at 285 (noting that Lochner is "an anticanonical case"); Shapiro,
supra note 31, at 538-42 (describing use of substantive due process based on "right to be let alone" that
first surfaced in regard to economic rights during the Lochner era and then later with regard to personal
liberty).
64. See Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due Process
and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CAL. L. REv. 751, 788-89 (2009) (noting that "Lochner
revisionism has generated a veritable cottage industry of claims"); Jeffrey Rosen, Economic Freedoms
and the Constitution, 35 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 13, 13-15 (2012) (noting that "[s]ome libertarians
now argue that Lochner is defensible" and detailing position of several prominent scholars); see also
Randy E. Barnett, Is the Constitution Libertarian?, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 9, 13 (2009) (disclosing
that Peckham's opinion in Lochner is his favorite Supreme Court majority opinion).
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of articles attempting to predict the Court's response to the plaintiffs liberty
arguments.6 ' That speculation was put to rest when the Court released its
opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius.6  First, a brief summary of the Court's multiple
opinions in the case is in order. Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia,
joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, 67 authored separate opinions
that emphasize a liberty interest inherent in the Commerce Clause, which they
found was violated by the individual mandate. 68  These two opinions will be
discussed jointly as the "Commerce Clause majority.",6 9 Justice Ginsburg wrote
in favor of finding the mandate constitutional under the Commerce Clause and
was joined by Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor. 7 0  The Justices who
signed onto Ginsburg's concurrence joined the part of the Chief Justice's
opinion holding that the mandate is constitutional under the tax power.
The Commerce Clause majority rejected the mandate, arguing that there is
a liberty right inherent in the Commerce Clause that protects an individual's
decision to enter a regulated market.72 The crux of the matter to the Commerce
65. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Turning Citizens into Subjects: Why the Health Insurance Mandate
Is Unconstitutional, 62 MERCER L. REv. 608, 617 (2011) (predicting five votes to strike down the
individual mandate); Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of
Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 2 (2011) (referring to constitutional objections to ACA
as "silly"); Rosen, supra note 64, at 22 ("It is doubtful there are five votes on behalf of striking down
healthcare in the name of a Lochnerian right of personal autonomy."); Smith, supra note 38 (casting
doubt on federalism claims).
66. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
67. Justice Thomas wrote a brief separate dissent solely to reassert his rejection of the "substantial
effects" test under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68. The precedential value of the Commerce Clause opinions are subject to debate given that none of
the Justices who signed on to Justice Scalia's dissent signed on to the Chief Justice's opinion and the
Chief Justice's Commerce Clause discussion is arguably unnecessary dicta given the tax holding.
Compare Tonja Jacobi, Obamacare as a Window on Judicial Strategy, 80 TENN. L. REV. 763, 799
(2013) (discussing Chief Justice's attempt to characterize his Commerce Clause analysis as binding and
potential limited use of the opinion in future cases), with Barnett, supra note 14, at 1336-37 (arguing
Chief Justice's opinion is holding).
69. It is unknown why the Justices who joined Justice Scalia's dissent did not sign on to the Chief
Justice's opinion, but it is "rumored to have been driven by spite towards Roberts for switching sides on
the constitutionality of the mandate as a tax." Jacobi, supra note 68, at 826.
70. Nat 'lFed'n ofIndep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2615 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
71. The Chief Justice, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, and the Scalia dissent both wrote
separately rejecting the Medicaid expansion. Id. at 2606-07 (plurality opinion); id. at 2666 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor would have permitted the Medicaid expansion as written
in the statute. Id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
72. The Chief Justice argued that individual rights are not just located in the Bill of Rights but rather
that the Framers intended for the limited rights of the federal government to be a powerful check against
infringement on personal liberty. Id. at 2577-78 (Roberts, C.J.) ("[T]he Constitution did not initially
include a Bill of Rights at least partly because the Framers felt the enumeration of powers sufficed to
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Clause majority was the distinction between activity and inactivity.73 While the
Commerce Clause allows regulation of economic activity, it does not allow the
government to "compel[] individuals to become active in commerce by
purchasing a product." 74 In other words, there is a liberty interest involved in
choosing to subject oneself to federal regulation.75
The Commerce Clause majority rejects the government's argument that the
cost the uninsured impose on the market for health care by utilizing services for
which they cannot pay constitutes economic activity.76 Although these costs
are substantial-approximately $1,000 a year to every insured-that harm is
insufficient to override the liberty interest.77 Accepting this harm justification,
they reason, would set a precedent that "individuals may be regulated under the
Commerce Clause whenever enough of them are not doing something the
Government would have them do." 7 8
This activity/inactivity distinction leads to a concern that the mandate
would create a slippery slope of potentially unlimited federal power.79  If
Congress can compel this action because the aggregate economic harm is felt
by others, they reason, then there is no limit to what Congress can compel
because nearly every action or inaction in our interdependent economy has
some impact on commerce.o Today, Congress compels the purchase of health
insurance, tomorrow it will be mandates to purchase domestic cars to improve
restrain the Government. As Alexander Hamilton put it, 'the Constitution is itself, in every rational
sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS."'); see also id. at 2677 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that notions of freedom embodied in structural protections of the Constitution are "central to
liberty").
73. See id. at 2587 (Roberts, C.J.); see also id. at 2648 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2587 (Roberts, C.J.) (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 2648 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. See id. at 2586 (Roberts, C.J.) ("The power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of
commercial activity to be regulated."); id. at 2587 (arguing that mandate does not regulate activity but
rather "compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product"); id. at 2646
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Commerce Clause does not allow Congress to "command"
individuals to "participate in the market [for health insurance]"); see also id. at 2592 (Roberts, C.J.)
(finding mandate unconstitutional under Necessary and Proper Clause because it is not limited to "those
who by some preexisting activity bring themselves within the sphere of federal regulation").
76. Id. at 2585.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 2588; see also id. at 2650 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting aggregate harm to the economy
as adequate justification for infringement on this liberty interest).
79. See id. at 2588 (Roberts, C.J.) (reasoning that cost to society of obesity is greater than cost of
uninsured and thus would open the door for vegetable mandate); id. at 2650 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating that if harm to economy that could be caused by uninsured justifies regulations, then so would
harm from failure to buy domestic cars or broccoli).
80. See id. at 2588 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2650 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the economy or vegetables to lower health care costs imposed by obesity.81 In
essence, this line of reasoning reflects a concern that once diffused, aggregated,
economic harm is accepted to justify government regulation it will be difficult
to find an appropriate limitation.8 2
Although couched in terms of separation of powers, the Commerce Clause
majority seems most concerned with liberty in the sense of liberal autonomy. 83
Many commentators have argued that this federalism argument is merely a
substantive due process liberty claim in disguise.8 4  Even Justice Ginsburg's
concurrence notes that although the substantive due process claims were
abandoned by the plaintiffs in the litigation, the Commerce Clause majority had
"plant[ed] such protections in the Commerce Clause."" The critique is not
surprising.86 Both opinions are rife with references to the Framers and their
concerns for the protection of liberty. 7 They also frequently speak in terms of
autonomy and choice, focusing on the freedom to choose whether to enter the
insurance market. 8
This liberty interest represents a strict view of liberal autonomy. The right
81. Id.
82. See Rosen & Schmidt, supra note 17, at 144-45 (arguing Commerce Clause majority was
incorrect to require limiting principle for novel question of constitutional interpretation).
83. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n ofIndep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2587 (allowing Congress to regulate inactivity
would empower Congress to make unlimited decisions for individuals); id. at 2591 ("The Commerce
Clause is not a general license to regulate an individual from cradle to grave, simply because he will
predictably engage in particular transactions.").
84. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 16, at 900 (arguing Chief Justice and Scalia's dissent "import a
substantive due process limitation into the Commerce Clause"); Smith, supra note 38, at 1746 (stating
arguments made by opponents of mandate are actually "[s]muggling a libertarian-based limitation into
constitutional law by concealing it in the garb of federalism").
85. Nat'! Fed'n ofIndep. Bus., 132 St. Ct. at 2623 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg
also quipped that the argument that "an individual cannot be subject to Commerce Clause regulation
absent voluntary, affirmative acts that enter him or her into, or affect, the interstate market expresses a
concern for individual liberty that [is] more redolent of Due Process Clause arguments." Id. at 2623
(quoting Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
86. As commentators have noted, the focus on individual rights is not a good fit with a doctrine
generally concerned with the relationship between the federal and state governments. See Rosen &
Schmidt, supra note 17, at 124 (critiquing new "Liberty-Centered Federalism" found in NFIB).
87. See, e.g., Nat' Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2578 (describing how Framers intended
"federalism [to] protect[] the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power"); id at 2589 (allowing
Congress to compel action "is not the country the Framers of our Constitution envisioned"); id. at 2646
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Federalist No. 58).
88. See, e.g., id. at 2586-87 (Roberts, C.J.) (describing mandate as Congress's attempt to "compel
individuals not engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted product"); id. at 2646 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "Congress has impressed into service" healthy individuals and forced them to
purchase insurance they do not want).
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not to enter a market is used as a trump to federal regulation-neither opinion
balances this liberty interest against the social harm to be avoided. 9 This
position arguably goes even further than Lochner by using economic rights as
trumps rather than balancing the right against other social concerns.90 In
addition, the Commerce Clause majority's slippery slope discussion reflects a
concern about the difficulty of reigning in the harm principle. 9' They
recognized that allowing aggregate economic harm to override autonomy
makes the harm principle virtually limitless in an interconnected world. 92
Even the Chief Justice's swing vote to uphold the mandate under the taxing
power was based on autonomy.9' The Chief Justice determined that the
mandate's shared responsibility payment is a tax and not a punitive penalty
because individuals are still left "with a lawful choice" to purchase insurance
"so long as he is willing to pay a tax levied on that choice." 94 In other words,
the difference between a penalty (unauthorized by the Commerce Clause) and a
constitutionally permissible tax centers on notions of autonomy. The only
difference is that liberty from taxes is trumped by Congress's explicit tax
power.95
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence makes the case for a more expanded harm
principle by attacking the notion that the harm caused by free riders on the
health care system does not outweigh whatever liberty interest might be found
in the Commerce Clause.96 Unlike other markets, everyone will eventually
need to enter the health care market, often at unexpected times, and will receive
that care regardless of their ability to pay.97  The cost of free riders thus
89. See id. at 2589 (Roberts, C.J.) (rejecting consideration of cost of uninsured); id. at 2650 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (rejecting social cost of failure to purchase insurance as irrelevant because no "activity" is
regulated there).
90. See Nourse, supra note 64, at 767-68 (arguing that Lochner did not use right to contract as trump
because the right did not trigger strict scrutiny but rather was weighed against reasonable police power
of state).
91. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
92. See Nat'1Fed'n ofIndep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2589 ("People, for reasons of their own, often fail to
do things that would be good for them or good for society. Those failures-joined with the similar
failures of others-can readily have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.").
93. Metzger, supra note 15, at 85 (noting Chief Justice's treatments of Commerce Clause and tax
power "share a libertarian resistance to compulsory measures in favor of choice and incentives").
94. Nat'1Fed'n ofIndep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2600.
95. See Metzger, supra note 15, at 89-90 (describing extensive breadth of tax power). Even while
allowing the mandate under this broad power, the Chief Justice still limited his tax holding by signaling
that the tax question was right on the border of constitutionality. Jacobi, supra note 68, at 778-79.
96. Nat'lFed'n ofIndep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2610-12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
97. See, e.g., id. at 2610-11.
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imposes a substantial harm on society.98 These features, she argued, distinguish
the mandate from the parade of horribles the Commerce Clause majority argued
would result from upholding the mandate under the Commerce Clause.99
Justice Ginsburg also rejects the activity/inactivity distinction and Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia's concerns about unbridled federal power.100
She argues that the difference between action and inaction in doctrine is a
matter of semantics and the mandate should be characterized as an economic
choice to self-insure. 101  In addition, she reasons the activity/inactivity
distinction is not needed to reign in the Commerce Clause, as the Court has
already limited the Commerce Clause when the action regulated has "only an
attenuated effect on interstate commerce and is traditionally left to state law."1 02
To justify the Chief Justice's hypothetical vegetable mandate, the Court would
have to accept a "chain of inferences" that the "vegetable-purchase mandate
was likely to have a substantial effect on the health-care costs borne by lithe
Americans,"1 03 and the Court has already rejected this type of "piling of
inference upon inference."104
III. AUTONOMY AND CONSEQUENCES
There has been much debate over whether the NFIB majority was correct
in finding a liberty interest in the Commerce Clause,os but very little has been
said about whether the choice to purchase health insurance involves a liberty
interest that is aligned with the conceptions of autonomy advanced by
98. Id. at 2611 (noting that uninsured receive $43 billion worth of uncompensated care).
99. Id. at 2620 (noting that if an individual "eventually wants a car or has a craving for broccoli, she
will be obliged to pay at the counter before receiving the vehicle or nourishment").
100. Id. at 2621-22.
101. For example, she notes that the holding in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), which the
Chief Justice describes as regulating the activity of growing wheat for home consumption, actually states
that the Commerce Clause allows "forcing some farmers into the market to buy what they could provide
for themselves." Nat'lFed'n ofIndep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2621 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also id. at
2622.
102. Id. at 2623.
103. Id. at 2624. The Court would have to accept that "individuals forced to buy vegetables would
then eat them ... would prepare the vegetables in a healthy way ... would cut back on unhealthy foods,
and would not allow other factors ... to trump the improved diet." Id.
104. Id. In addition, she notes that other protections, including the "liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause," would likely invalidate such a purchase mandate. Id.
105. See, e.g., Craig L. Jackson, The Limiting Principle Strategy and Challenges to the New Deal
Commerce Clause, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 11, 11-13 (2012); Kahn, supra note 5; Rosen & Schmidt,
supra note 17; David A. Strauss, Commerce Clause Revisionism and the Affordable Care Act, 2012 Sup.
CT. REv. 1, 1 (2012).
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opponents of the mandate. This Article argues that opponents of the individual
mandate, including the majority of the Supreme Court, are advancing a
simplistic view of liberty that ignores the role of consequences in the theory of
autonomy that best comports with their worldview. Without consequences,
liberty is incomplete and does not possess either the consequentialist or non-
consequentialist values that are attributed to liberal autonomy. Economic
choices in general, including the decisions to purchase health insurance, are
more likely than personal rights to have consequences limited by the state.
Therefore, we should be careful before attributing the full value of autonomy to
them because elevating less than full autonomy leads to conceptual and
practical problems that can put true liberty in jeopardy.
A. Considering Consequences in Constituting Autonomy
As discussed, proponents of economic liberty, including the Commerce
Clause majority in NFIB, advance a conception of liberty that most coincides
with liberal autonomy. This Millian individual self-determination can be
defined as an individual's ability to develop and exercise that capacity to form,
revise, and pursue one's conceptions of "the good."1 0 6 To exercise this capacity
for self-determination, experimentation is necessary. Autonomy "depends on
opportunities to choose among different types of life and to pursue diverse
goals."1 07  This experimentation allows an individual to "use and interpret
experience in his own way." 08 By trying out different actions, one can reflect
on what is good, refine and revise what one values, and determine the best
means to achieve those ends.1 09 Two people may interpret a particular
experience in two different ways, or they may interpret an experience the same
way but come to two different conclusions about whether the experience was a
positive one."o In other words, autonomy does not require agreement on a
predetermined outcome." Rather, autonomy provides individuals the capacity
106. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
107. Fallon, supra note 44, at 888; see also MIL, supra note 10, at 47 ("[T]he worth of different
modes of life should be proved practically, when any one thinks fit to try them.").
108. MILL, supra note 10, at48.
109. Id. at 49 (noting that choosing a plan for one's life requires use of "observation to see, reasoning
and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide"); Fallon,
supra note 44, at 888 (describing an autonomous self as "one capable of at least partially transforming
herself through thought, criticism, and self-interpretation").
110. MILL, supra note 10, at48.
111. Id. at 56 ("There is no reason that all human existences should be constructed on some one, or
some small number of patterns. If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and
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and opportunity to determine what it is they most desire and the method they
believe will be best to achieve those ends."12
Defined as such, liberal autonomy requires consequences for the
deliberation and experimentation necessary to constitute autonomy.11 3 In order
to deliberate, one needs data on which to deliberate.11 4 In order to choose a
plan for oneself, an individual must "use observation to see, reasoning and
judgment to foresee, [and] activity to gather materials for decision.""' In other
words, to make a deliberative decision you must collect information about the
world through your personal experiences and then interpret it to come to your
own conception of the good.
A crucial component of this data is the outcome of previous experiences-
both one's own and the experiences of others. 116 The consequences of previous
choices inform deliberation regarding current choices. '7 Viewing the outcome
of others' decisions also provides valuable data points to consider in
deliberation and experimentation."' As such, even if a decision is only made
once in one's life or the consequences of the decision are not felt until after it is
too late to change course, the observation of the consequences of others'
decisions will help shape how an individual deliberates and forms her own
choice.1 1 9
experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best itself, but
because it is his own mode.").
112. Not only did Mill not require homogenous outcomes, he considered them to be the very ill that
liberty was meant to remedy. See id. at 50 ("[S]ociety has now fairly got the better of individuality; and
the danger which threatens human nature is not the excess, but the deficiency, of personal impulses and
preferences."); see also Fleming, supra note 6, at 17 (noting that liberalism embraces plurality of
opinions and beliefs as byproducts of pursuit of the good).
113. See supra Part III.A.
114. See MILL, supra note 10, at 49.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 35 ("[T]here are many truths of which the full meaning cannot be realized, until personal
experience has brought it home.").
117. See id. at 17.
118. Id. at 47-48.
119. Direct experience and the opportunity for repeated experimentation with time to change course
arguably holds more practical value to individuals than second-hand data through observation. Studies
have shown that decisions that are not repeated or decisions with delayed consequences are ones where
individuals have the most difficulty making decisions that will lead to outcomes that match their
expressed preferences. See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is
Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CIU. L. REV. 1159, 1172-79 (2003). It is perhaps not surprising then that many
circumstances where the state steps in to ameliorate consequences relate to choices where negative
consequences are delayed until changing course is difficult or impossible, such as the decision to save
for retirement.
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In this way, consequences are essential for experimentation. An
experiment is "something that you do to see how well or how badly it
works." 120  The consequences of the experiment, either one's own
consequences or the observed consequences of others' choices, are how one
determines whether the outcome was desirable (and similar choices should be
repeated) or undesirable (and similar choices should be avoided).
When the state steps in to deliberately remove or distort consequences, it
interferes with the intrinsic value of autonomy. Deliberation on distorted data
is not as useful to an individual in forming the individual's own conception of
the good or how to pursue it.1 21  The removal of consequences can lead
individuals on a path away from their conception of the good if they make
otherwise bad decisions that lead to positive outcomes. 122 In addition, when
outcomes are predetermined, there is less value to experimenting because there
is no way to achieve a new result.
Even if an individual is aware of the distorting effects of altered
consequences, autonomy is not fully restored.1 23  Taking for granted that one
would be able to account for the distorted results in one's deliberations,
individuals are still deprived of the value of experimentation because all
experiments lead to the same result.1 24 If a particular outcome is desired, the
state has the option of either regulating choices in such a way as to ensure a
uniform outcome or simply providing a uniform outcome via a government
program. Both options greatly lessen the benefits of deliberation and
experimentation and, thus, both constitute an infringement of autonomy.
Finally, there is a limited right to claim autonomy by someone who is aware
120. Experiment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/experiment (last
visited Jan. 22, 2016).
121. See MILL, supra note 10, at 97. Mill argues that governments should not "substitute [their] own
activity for" the mental exertion and development work of its citizens because doing so "dwarfs"
individuals and eventually injures the state. Id.
122. In addition, Mill argues that autonomous experimentation has a utilitarian value to society by
allowing others to view the results of their peers' experiments and learn from the results. Id. at 53. This
lesson is only valuable if viewing a poor decision is coupled with "displays [of| painful or degrading
consequences." Id. at 70.
123. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 119, at 1177.
124. It is questionable whether individuals will correctly internalize the effect of the lack of
consequences in charting their course toward the good, given demonstrated limited cognitive abilities.
See infra note 239 (discussing cognitive biases). The benefit to others in evaluating choices through
observation will also be distorted regardless of the decisionmaker's knowledge of the ameliorated
consequences because they may not realize that the good consequences are not the natural result of the
observed choices. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 119, at 1174-75.
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that her actions are being absolved of any negative consequences. 2 5  In other
words, general notions of fairness suggest that no one has the right to play a
rigged game.
To provide a concrete example of the way consequences change the way
individuals exercise their autonomy, consider the movement to privatize Social
Security. Over the years, there have been proposals to partially privatize Social
Security by allowing individuals to make investment decisions regarding their
Social Security funds and even allow individuals to decide their level of
contribution. 126 Given that current Social Security payments are barely above
the poverty line, it is almost certain that any privatization plan that gives people
an option of saving less or taking risks with those savings would lead to large
numbers of retirees with inadequate savings on which to live.1 27  Some
additional payments to ameliorate the consequences of their failure to save
adequately or their poor investment decisions would be necessary to avoid a
large number of senior citizens living in abject poverty.12 8
Such a system provides distorted feedback on investment decisions: If you
invest insufficient funds or make risky investment choices, the upside of risky
investments can be substantial while the downside is greatly limited by the
safety net. Friends and neighbors who hear of risky investment decisions may
suffer from these distortions as well if they are told of investments and any big
payoffs but negative consequences are never observed. Additionally, any
moral claim to the right to make investment decisions while socializing the risk
of the downside of those decisions appears incredibly weak.
Apart from deliberation and experimentation, the role of consequences
helps justify the utilitarian value of autonomy. Perhaps due to the success of
125. See Purdy & Siegel, supra note 9, at 387 (quoting then-Governor Mitt Romney as remarking
with respect to his state's mandate that "a free ride on the government is not libertarian").
126. See Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 18, at 359-60 (noting current efforts to privatize Social
Security); Kathryn L. Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Misguided Reform, 71 TEMP. L. REV.
131, 148 n.105 (1998) (describing various privatization proposals from 1990s); id. at 150 n. 110 (listing
nine examples of bills introduced by members of Congress to partially privatize Social Security by
allowing some portion of payroll taxes to be placed into private accounts controlled by individuals).
127. Social Security payments are currently barely above the poverty line, and 34% of workers have
no savings set aside for retirement. See Social Security Fact Sheet, U.S. Soc. SECURITY ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/factsheets/basicfact-alt.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2016). At $1,269 per
month, the average Social Security income for an individual is less than $4,000 per year above the
federal poverty line. See 2013 Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (Dec. 1,
2013), http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/13poverty.cfmn.
128. These payments would be inevitable, given the nation's moral commitment to alleviating poverty
in the elderly. See Metzger, supra note 15, at 108 (noting that Social Security and Medicare are "plainly
emblematic of [our] national and collective commitment to meeting certain basic needs").
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liberal autonomy as a governing philosophy, it is generally taken for granted
that society will not devolve into chaos and immorality if individuals are
allowed free reign, subject only to their own judgment and an appropriately
constrained requirement not to harm others. In advancing the idea of autonomy
over a model of stricter governmental and societal control, Mill needed to
articulate a case for what is now presumed.1 29  On Liberty is, at its heart, a
strong utilitarian defense of personal autonomy that parallels Mill's defense of
the freedom of speech.130
In Mill's argument, consequences play a crucial role by providing a
substitute for government regulation (or oppressive social approbation). As
noted above, autonomy does not require a particular choice or conception of the
good and, in fact, promotes a variety of individualized value preferences.13 '
Consequences allow for this neutrality by providing a risk-regulating pressure
on individual actions that reflects the values and risk tolerance of that
individual. 3 2 If a choice leads to an outcome an individual deems negative, she
does not do it again. If an individual understands the risks of an activity, she
will only choose that activity if she has sufficient tolerance for that risk. In this
way, autonomy has value not just as self-direction but also as an internal risk
regulator based on the individual's conception and tolerance for the risk of
harm to self. Under a robust notion of autonomy, it is, therefore, unnecessary
129. Purdy & Siegel, supra note 9, at 383-84 (describing Mill's struggle to "strip[] away arbitrary,
unnecessary, and self-serving regulation of individuals").
130. Mill likens freedom of action to freedom of speech. Mill's argument in favor of dissident speech
takes three parts: First, that dissent may, in fact, be true and refusing to allow such an opinion on the
mistaken belief that current custom is infallible robs society of new and better ideas. MILL, supra note
10, at 14-15. Second, the dissenting opinion may be false, but rebutting false opinions provides new
strength to the recognized truth. Such dissent is necessary to reinvigorate doctrine and prevent those in
the right from growing lax in their defense of the truth and to prevent the meaning of doctrine from
being lost to "mere formal profession." Id. at 43. Third, neither doctrine nor dissent is entirely correct;
rather, they "share the truth between them; and the non-conforming opinion is needed to supply the
remainder of the truth, of which the received doctrine embodies only a part." Id. at 38. Without the
missing piece the dissent provides, doctrine runs the risk of becoming extremist. Id.
131. See supra note 111.
132. Mill repeatedly invokes consequences as a counterweight to cabin autonomy based on the
individual's own value system. See, e.g., MILL, supra note 10, at 9 (stating liberty is right to "fram[e]
the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may
follow"); id. at 46 ("[M]en should be free to act upon their opinions-to carry these out in their lives,
without hindrance . . . from their fellow-men, so long as it is at their own risk and peril. This last
proviso is of course indispensable."); id. at 64 ("In all such cases there should be perfect freedom, legal
and social, to do the action and stand the consequences."); id. at 65 (arguing additional consequences
cannot be imposed to limit choice unless they are naturally imposed); id. at 67 (noting that punishing
those who make bad decisions is not necessary because negative consequences are sufficient
punishment); id. at 70 ("[T]he decision ought to rest with those who are to abide the consequences.").
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for the state to step in and regulate behavior with one-size-fits-all regulations
based on values and risk tolerance that may not align with an individual's
views. Consequences provide a custom regulation of sorts that is naturally
tailored to the individual regulated.1 33
Without consequences, this risk regulation function does not work.
Consider the example of a program to privatize Social Security that allows for
broad discretion in investment decisions but ameliorates much of the negative
consequences of those decisions by providing a minimum level of financial
support to the elderly. 134 Such a system encourages an out-sized tolerance for
risk as the upside of such risk returns to the individual while the downside is at
least partially ameliorated.
Consequences are thus important, from both a deontological and
consequentialist perspective, and are a necessary component of fully robust
liberal autonomy. Liberal autonomy can be conceived of as a fulcrum, with
choice and consequences placed on either end. When the state does not
intervene to infringe on choices or consequences, the scales are balanced and
fully robust autonomy exists. If the state intervenes to remove consequences,
the balance of autonomy is upset and something less than autonomy remains.
Like limitations on choices, the state can limit consequences to varying
degrees. Consequences can be fully removed or only partially removed,
leaving liberty lacking in varying degrees, which counsels attaching different
values to the choices at issue.'13  The bankruptcy system, for example, provides
a way to avoid some of the consequences of poor credit decisions by giving
debtors a fresh start.1 36 In this way, every credit decision is lacking in full
autonomy. However, the bankruptcy process is difficult and many families still
struggle post-bankruptcy with the same difficult financial circumstances the
"fresh start" was meant to alleviate.137 There are still a wide range of choices
and significant remaining consequences, suggesting that Americans still retain
a large level of autonomy over credit decisions, even if they are not fully
133. Consequences also provide an argument against paternalistic regulation. It is more difficult to
argue that the state knows what is best for an individual if the individual is the one who lives with the
consequences. See id. at 70 (dismissing paternalism as illegitimate justification for regulation because
the individual, not state, bears consequences of failure to care for oneself).
134. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
135. See infra Part IV.B (describing proportionalism framework to determine value of choices with
diminished consequences).
136. See Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure ofBankruptcy's Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL
L. REv. 67, 71-75 (2006) (discussing theoretical underpinnings for idea of "fresh start" in bankruptcy).
137. See id. at 83-93 (collecting empirical data demonstrating that benefits of bankruptcy do not
alleviate all, or even most, financial difficulties faced by struggling families).
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autonomous." Even a fully consequence-free choice may have some value, 3 9
but the quality of that choice falls far short of a fully autonomous choice.
When dealing with incomplete liberty, some regulations can be useful to
restore or replace the deliberative or risk-regulating functions of autonomy.
For example, Social Security provides a safety net for seniors to help alleviate
the consequences of failing to adequately save for retirement. Given that the
consequences of failing to save are largely mitigated, the Social Security tax
that replaces the deliberative decision of whether to save for retirement should
not be seen as an independent infringement on liberty. One could argue that the
entire Social Security system should be scrapped in favor of full autonomy over
retirement and savings decisions,1 40 but it is internally inconsistent to argue for
liberty over the choice to save while maintaining the safety net that ameliorates
the consequences.141 In other words, when consequences are significantly
diminished, autonomy is incomplete and the proper question is not autonomy
versus the regulatory justification but rather whether the regulation restores or
replaces the consequences.1 42
B. Incomplete Consequences for Economic Rights
The use of autonomy to justify individual personal rights-such as freedom
of speech, religious exercise, and privacy-does not generally raise issues with
limited consequences because these rights are not particularly susceptible to
having a meaningful measure of consequences removed. The consequences of
such choices are personal and, therefore, difficult to alter through state
interference.14
The move to embrace liberal autonomy as a justification for economic
138. See infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing value of choices when a meaningful measure of consequences
remain).
139. See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing value of public-private social programs that involve choices
where large portion of consequences are removed).
140. Some libertarians are in favor of doing away with Social Security, but there is no consensus on
the issue even among libertarians. See Draper, supra note 24.
141. There may be some middle ground that could increase choice while still maintaining the safety
net, but that possibility may be foreclosed by the Commerce Clause majority in NFIB. See infra Part
III.D. 1.
142. It should not be necessary to rely on harm to others or the heavier burden required to justify
paternalistic regulations to justify these regulations.
143. For example, the decision to speak publicly on a controversial topic may gain you the admiration
of your peer group or the scorn of those who disagree with you, but those consequences are not
particularly susceptible to government interference. In fact, the First Amendment prohibits the
government from stopping those who would speak in response to your speech.
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rights creates more potential for the mislabeling of incomplete liberty. The
interconnectedness of our economy and the existence of broad economic safety
nets mean that economic choices are often lacking in at least some
consequences, and thus, involve some level of incomplete liberty. 144 The
choice to purchase health insurance provides a compelling example of such a
decision.
The Affordable Care Act was enacted to address the problem of large
numbers of Americans who do not have health insurance and to rein in the cost
of health care. 145  For many, the "choice" to purchase health insurance was
largely illusory because they lacked the means or opportunity to do so.1 46 The
ACA's first goal was to make private health insurance more accessible to all. 147
To do so, the ACA creates a regulatory structure that prevents insurance
companies from denying coverage due to pre-existing conditions (the
guaranteed-issue provision) and requires insurance companies to price policies
based on the general risks of a community rather than on individual health (the
community-rating provision).1 48 These measures alone run the risk of making
health insurance prohibitively expensive by encouraging only unhealthy people
to procure health insurance and allowing individuals to wait to purchase
insurance until they fall ill.1 4 9 The individual mandate was designed to address
this adverse selection problem by ensuring that all those with sufficient income
would purchase insurance to offset the cost of coverage for the unhealthy.150
These provisions together were intended to make health insurance more
144. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 660 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("We live in a
Nation knit together by two centuries of scientific, technological, commercial, and environmental
change. Those changes, taken together, mean that virtually every kind of activity, no matter how local,
genuinely can affect commerce, or its conditions, outside the State-at least when considered in the
aggregate.").
145. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2571 (2012).
146. Private insurance on the open market was often prohibitively expensive and insurance companies
would frequently refuse to insure individuals with expensive pre-existing medical conditions or charge
significantly higher rates to individuals in poor health. Id. at 2613 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
147. In addition, the ACA greatly expanded Medicaid to allow states to provide coverage to more of
their citizens. Id. at 2582 (Roberts, C.J.) (noting ACA requires states to "provide Medicaid coverage to
adults with incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level"). Although the Court struck down the
requirement that states provide the expansion, it left intact the option for states to accept the Medicaid
expansion. Id. at 2608.
148. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1 to -4 (2012).
149. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2613-14 (Ginsburg J., concurring) (describing failed
experiment by various states to enact guaranteed-issue and community-rating laws without mandate and
subsequent "death spiral" in those states' insurance markets).
150. Id. at 2585 (Roberts, C.J.).
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affordable for more people, thus providing a larger group access to quality,
affordable health care.15 1
The individual mandate serves another purpose, independent of its
redistributive function. It corrects a situation where autonomy was fragmented
by the government's intervention to ameliorate the consequences of failing to
purchase health insurance. 15 2 For the group of individuals who can afford to
purchase health insurance, a significant measure of the consequences of the
failure to purchase insurance has been mitigated by a patchwork of safety nets,
which ensures that those who cannot afford insurance, or choose not to
purchase it, are still provided a minimal level of healthcare.' The 1986
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) and various
state laws require hospitals to provide emergency care to all, regardless of their
ability to pay.1 54  Public and private charitable clinics provide additional
preventative and non-emergency services, although their reach is not
comprehensive.' The bankruptcy system also ensures that the failure to
purchase insurance will not lead to a lack of care because individuals can
receive life-saving non-emergency treatment they know they cannot afford and
declare bankruptcy after the fact. 5 6 Hospitals and doctors pass on the cost of
151. See Peter Brandon Bayer, The Individual Mandate's Due Process Legality: A Kantian
Explanation, and Why It Matters, 44 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 865, 912 (2013) (arguing individual mandate is
justified as tax under Kantian theory because it prevents individuals from becoming so destitute that they
cannot function as dignified individuals).
152. The individual mandate makes a good case study to explore the concept of incomplete liberty
because, by statute, it relates to decisions by only those who have a meaningful level of choice in
purchasing health insurance. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A
(2012) (outlining "shared responsibility payment" that applies only to those whose income exceeds a
certain threshold and for whom purchase of health insurance would not exceed a certain percentage of
their income). Thus, the question of whether a true choice exists over the decision to purchase health
insurance is answered by statute. See infra Part IV.B (step one of proportionalism framework).
153. See Nat' Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2610 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("[T]he inability to
pay for care does not mean that an uninsured individual will receive no care. Federal and state law, as
well as professional obligations and embedded social norms, require hospitals and physicians to provide
care when it is most needed, regardless of the patient's ability to pay.").
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012); see also Nat '1 Fed'n ofIndep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2610.
155. Some politicians opposed to the Affordable Care Act touted this patchwork of care as a reason
why healthcare reform was not needed because all can access this safety net. Brietta Clark, A Moral
Mandate & the Meaning of Choice: Conceiving the Affordable Care Act After NFIB, 6 ST. LoUIS U. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 267, 312-13 (2013) (noting that federal and state politicians made remarks "that
insurance is not even that important because people can always get care in the emergency room").
156. See W. David Koeninger, The Statute Whose Name We Dare Not Speak: EMTALA and the
Affordable Care Act, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 139, 169 (2013). Bankruptcy is not a consequence-
free decision, see supra note 136, but it is better than the alternative of being unable to access treatment
without the ability to pay up front.
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this uncompensated care to insurance companies through higher rates, which
trigger higher premiums for the insured.15 7
The uninsured may choose not to purchase insurance either assuming that
they will not incur unexpected substantial healthcare costs or recognizing the
risk and intentionally relying on the safety net should such costs occur."
These are individuals who choose to gamble on not needing health insurance,
secure in the knowledge that should they lose that bet the worst consequences
of the failure to insure will be ameliorated due to a public commitment to
provide minimum healthcare for all."9 The ACA's guaranteed-issue provision
provides a further backstop against the consequences of not purchasing health
insurance because the guaranteed-issue provision enables individuals to
purchase health insurance when they discover an expensive medical condition
that would have excluded them from coverage as a pre-existing condition in a
free market. 60
There are certainly still some negative consequences to not having health
insurance. Many without insurance do not have access to preventative care,
which leads to worse health outcomes. 161 There is evidence that the uninsured,
especially those who live in poor areas where local hospitals are overburdened
with nonpaying patients, have less access to quality preventative medicine and
care for chronic illnesses. 162 However, for those who can afford monthly health
insurance premiums, it is likely that they could also afford routine preventative
care if they chose it, thus avoiding the negative effects caused by the
combination of poverty and lack of insurance. These individuals who are
157. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2585 ("Congress estimated that the cost of
uncompensated care raises family health insurance premiums, on average, by over $1,000 per year.").
158. The percentage of uninsured who are in a financial position to purchase health insurance but
choose not to may be a relatively small number. See id. at 2613 & n.1 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting
that in National Center for Health Statistics study, when asked why they lack coverage, most cited high
cost of insurance while a negligible number of people stated they lacked coverage because they "[d]id
not want or need coverage"). It is difficult to determine at what cost insurance switches from a
begrudged expense to truly unaffordable. The insurance mandate provides a bright line by applying
only to those who meet a certain income cutoff and the cost of insurance will not exceed a certain
percentage of their income. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
159. Nat'lFed'n ofIndep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2620 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
160. Justice Scalia recognized that the guaranteed-issue provision makes it more attractive for the
uninsured to gamble on purchasing insurance because they have a government-provided way out if they
develop a costly medical condition. Id. at 2645 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He saw that as a reason to
respect the choice not to purchase insurance, however, rather than limiting the value of that choice. Id.
161. Id. at 2611-12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
162. See Emily Whelan Parento, Health Equity, Healthy People 2020, and Coercive Legal
Mechanisms as Necessary for the Achievement ofBoth, 58 Loy. L. REv. 655, 684-85 (2012) ("Evidence
indicates that uninsured persons are more likely to have negative health outcomes.").
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uninsured by choice can pay for most routine care, only being forced to rely on
the public safety net for larger, unexpected costs.'6 3  The Commerce Clause
majority was particularly concerned with the liberty interests of these young,
healthy individuals who could purchase health insurance but chose not to.164
is this type of individual who is "attempt[ing] self-insurance with the back-stop
of shifting costs to others" that the mandate was meant to capture.1 65
Thus, for those covered by the individual mandate, there was an incomplete
liberty interest in the decision to purchase health insurance.166  This concept
was not foreign to the mandate's original creators. The brainchild of a
conservative think tank, the mandate was originally conceived of to instill a
sense of personal responsibility in those who did not purchase health insurance
because they knew that social morals would prevent any harm that might come
to them.1 67  It was meant to instill a "moral mandate" that everyone has a
personal obligation to purchase health insurance to cover the cost of their own
healthcare.1 68  The limited liberty interest remaining in the choice to purchase
health insurance was not recognized, however, by those who opposed the
adoption of the individual mandate. 16 9 Nor did the Commerce Clause majority
163. See Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2610 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that most
uninsured people cannot pay out of pocket for cost of non-routine care because a single hospital stay
costs upwards of $10,000, the cost for treating a heart attack exceeds $20,000, and the cost of a year of
cancer treatment exceeds $50,000). While those who remain uninsured by choice rather than necessity
may be a small subsection of the uninsured, it is for their benefit that the Commerce Clause majority
found a right to remain uninsured as they are the only individuals coerced by the mandate. See id. at
2608 (Roberts, C.J.).
164. Id. at 2590 (noting that mandate primarily affects healthy young people who "have other
priorities for spending their money"); id. at 2646 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Koeninger, supra note
156, at 166-67 (describing "striking" amount of time conservative Justices spent questioning counsel
about cost shifting to "healthy young adults").
165. See Nat'! Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2589-90 (quoting government's brief in support of
mandate under Commerce Clause).
166. Even those who might swear off government interference and pledge not to use assistance in
order to maintain their autonomy could do so secure in the knowledge that they will be able to change
their minds and access that care if (or when) they need it. See id. at 2620 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
("Under the current health-care system, healthy persons who lack insurance receive a benefit for which
they do not pay: They are assured that, if they need it, emergency medical care will be available,
although they cannot afford it."). There is no indication that individuals have refsed to use this safety
net in life threatening situations in order to preserve their autonomy.
167. Jennifer B. Wriggins, Mandates, Markets, and Risk: Auto Insurance and the Affordable Care
Act, 19 CoNN. INS. L.J. 275, 286 (2012) (describing the original justification for mandate proposed by
domestic policy director of Heritage Foundation in 1989).
168. Clark, supra note 155, at 276 (describing federal government's response to mandate, including
messaging that there is a duty that "those who can afford to buy insurance should and must do so").
169. See id. at 275-76 (noting that opponents of ACA, including politicians, popular media and
general public, feared that mandate was a "federal intrusion into every aspect of our personal lives that
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acknowledge that the liberty interest was diluted by the lack of
consequences.1 70 Rather, they found that the liberty at stake was so vital as to
justify a new theory of federalism focused on individual liberty.17 1
C. Do Consequences Always Matter?
How can we explain the failure of the ACA's opponents, including the
Commerce Clause majority, to consider the role of consequences in constituting
liberal autonomy? Perhaps those who oppose the mandate conceive of liberty
in such a way as to make consequences less necessary? 172 Liberal autonomy is
not without its critics, and there are other ways to conceive of autonomy where
consequences may not play as vital a role.173  Relational autonomy, a theory
that rejects the pure individualism of liberal autonomy, could provide a possible
explanation for the failure to consider consequences but that theory is not
consistent with the advancement of economic liberty. 74
Critical legal theorists, including many influential feminists, challenge the
basic assumption of liberal autonomy that individuals are purely self-
determining. " The liberal model, they argue, is one that presumes "that
individual autonomy is to be achieved by erecting a wall (of rights) between the
would ultimately destroy civilization as we know it").
170. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
171. See Rosen & Schmidt, supra note 17, at 124 (arguing that NFIB introduced new theory of
federalism that makes individual liberty focal point rather than a by-product of protecting states' rights).
172. There are numerous other definitions of autonomy in philosophy and the law. See NOMY
ARPALY, UNPRINCIPLED VIRTUE: AN INQUIRY INTO MORAL AGENCY 118-26 (2003) (describing "eight
distinct things" that are called autonomy); id. at 118-19 (noting that "autonomy" may be "a term of art
[that] performs so many tasks that it becomes at least as elusive and complex as the natural-language
term[] it was supposed to help clarifl"); see also Fallon, supra note 44, at 876 ("Autonomy ... is a
protean concept, which means different things to different people, and occasionally appears to change its
meaning in the course of a single argument."). This Article focuses on two broad theories of
autonomy-liberal and relational-that relate most closely to the debate over economic rights grounded
in autonomy.
173. One response to the perceived limitations of liberal autonomy is to reject autonomy as a value.
Others see value, and power, in the concept of autonomy but wish to re-conceptualize the term to take
into account the relatedness of human experience. Carlos A. Ball, This Is Not Your Father's Autonomy:
Lesbian and Gay Rights from a Feminist and Relational Perspective, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 345
(2005) (outlining relational autonomy as developed in feminist literature); Jennifer Nedelsky,
Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 10 (1989).
174. See Jurgen Habermas, Paradigms of Law, 17 CARDozo L. REv. 771, 774 (1996) (describing
difference between governance based on individual liberty, which requires individuals "to carry the
responsibility for the consequences of his decisions" and welfare-state models where that is not a
requirement).
175. See, e.g., Nedelsky, supra note 173, at 8-12.
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individual and those around him,"'76 and "thus fails to recognize the inherently
social nature of human beings."17 7 Relational autonomy accepts the idea of
autonomy as self-reflection and a way to "find and live in accordance with
one's own law"' 7 ' but recognizes that "one's own law is shaped by the society
in which one lives and the relationships that are a part of one's life."l 79
Although relational autonomy retains the importance of deliberation and
experimentation, it rejects the primacy of independence and self-sufficiency in
liberal autonomy.s0  Recognizing that no one is entirely self-sufficient,
autonomy is not an inherent state but rather a capacity that must be
developed.'"' As such, the state "may have certain obligations to ensure that
conditions exist that serve to nurture it."18 2
Rejecting the independence or self-sufficiency model, paternalistic
intervention, such as the removal consequences, is not always stigmatized as an
infringement on relational autonomy. When an individual is not autonomous
because she lacks capacity, action that seeks to "promote or enable the
autonomy of the person" may be justified.'83 One possible capacity-building
intervention is removing consequences to provide more space for risk taking to
those who would otherwise be limited in their choices. This can be more
productive than dictating choices that will lead to good outcomes because it
builds the self-deliberative capacity while lessening the risks of the choice. 18 4
The portions of the ACA that seek to increase access to health insurance, such
176. Id. at 12.
177. Id. at 8.
178. Id. at 10.
179. Id.
180. See Ball, supra note 173, at 353.
181. See Nedelsky, supra note 173, at 10.
182. Milton R. Regan, Jr., Getting Our Stories Straight: Narrative Autonomy and Feminist
Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 449, 452 (1997). Relational autonomy is not a negative liberty, as liberal
autonomy would suggest, where autonomy is achieved by simply leaving people alone. Rather,
relational autonomy is a positive liberty that creates "affirmative duties" to foster and develop individual
self-determination in society at large. Id. To put it another way, law and society are not "neutral" with
respect to autonomy. "The 'neutral' rules of the game correspond to a particular vision of the good
society which gives advantages to some players over others in systematic, if not perfectly predictable
ways." Nedelsky, supra note 173, at 19. Therefore, it is not enough to recognize that social forces
impact the individual; society must "make the interdependence of citizen and state conducive to, rather
than destructive of, autonomy." Id. at 20.
183. See generally John Christman, Relational Autonomy and the Social Dynamics ofPaternalism, 17
ETHICAL THEORY & MORALPRAC. 369 (2013).
184. Id. at 378-79 (arguing that providing services to individuals who have had their capacity for
autonomy destroyed by great suffering should include affirmative attempts to build capacity for
autonomy).
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as the Medicaid expansion and the guaranteed-issue and community-rating
provisions, can be seen as efforts to increase the autonomy of beneficiaries by
providing the healthcare that is necessary to exercise autonomy in all other
areas of life. 85
Although relational autonomy provides a compelling argument for the
possibility of limiting consequences while still preserving (or advancing)
autonomy, it is not in line with the rhetoric or the legal arguments made against
the mandate or in favor of economic rights. First, those covered by the
mandate are not lacking in the capacity for robust choice because the mandate
only applies to those who can afford insurance. 18 6 Second, the argument for
economic rights relies on the notions that everyone has equal autonomy and a
level playing field exists absent government interference.'8 7 This is anathema
to the idea that certain groups might need consequences diminished to provide
breathing room to develop capacity for autonomy. Finally, proponents of
relational autonomy would likely applaud the mandate for helping to increase
the capacity for autonomy of those who were shut out of the market for health
insurance.'
The Commerce Clause majority was clearly not embracing a theory of
relational autonomy. 8 9 Their opinions were a move away from precedent that
focuses on increasing the autonomy of members of systematically
disadvantaged groups by requiring economic actors to engage in commerce
with them, such as the public accommodation cases under the Civil Rights
Act.1 90 Instead, they moved toward a more liberal autonomy ideal, using
individual economic rights as a trump, rather than a factor to consider, in
185. See Parento, supra note 162, at 663 (stating that health "has a particular significance to
individuals-without health, individuals cannot fully function as human beings"); see also Bayer, supra
note 151, at 914. Professor Bayer uses Emmanuel Kant's philosophy to argue that "poverty is an
intolerable condition" and that autonomy requires the ability to rise above "mere animal survival" to
realize a higher potential. Id.
186. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
189. This reflects the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts' trend of "moving decisively away from any
protection for the egalitarian elements of American society" and towards economic rights and individual
autonomy. Stephen E. Gottlieb, Does What We Know About the Life Cycle of Democracy Fit
Constitutional Law?, 61 RUTGERs L. REv. 595, 606 (2009).
190. See Koeninger, supra note 156, at 179. Professor Koeninger notes that anti-discrimination laws
can be characterized as addressing inactivity-the failure to hire or enter into economic transactions
with minority populations-and finds unconvincing the Chief Justice's attempt to distinguish them as
regulating activity in a way that is materially different than the individual mandate. Id.; see also Strauss,
supra note 105, at 15-16 (arguing difficulty in reconciling NFIB with Civil Rights Act cases).
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balancing the capacity for autonomy among various groups within the
economy.191
If the argument for economic liberty is firmly rooted in the individualism
of liberal autonomy, as it appears to be, then when the state intervenes to
remove the consequences of a choice to ensure a uniform outcome, the
infringement on autonomy occurs when the protection is put into place. 192
After such infringement occurs, the remaining liberty is incomplete and should
not be valued as highly as choices where consequences are fully felt. In the
case of health insurance, liberty was infringed upon by ensuring that every
individual will have access to lifesaving care. The choice to purchase health
insurance was already lacking a meaningful level of autonomy.
D. Failure to Recognize Incomplete Liberty Undermines True Autonomy
As discussed, the majority of the Court in NFIB did not take the limited
nature of the autonomy interest over health insurance into account. Instead, it
embraces a liberty interest in choosing to purchase health insurance to expand
economic rights under the banner of federalism, essentially applying the harm
principle to a notion of complete autonomy.
Commentators have opined on various aspects of the NFIB decision-both
commending and attacking it.193 Many of these discussions either implicitly or
explicitly utilize the same autonomy-versus-harm framework inherent in the
Court's decision.1 94  Some see the NFIB decision as the first step by the
conservative members of the Court to use the liberty right to reign in the broad
191. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
192. These interventions are often justified on paternalistic grounds. Despite the fact that paternalism
is generally disfavored when it comes to limiting choices, many programs that use paternalistic
interventions to directly remove negative consequences are popular and accepted as social norms. See
Regina T. Jefferson, Privatization: Not the Answer for Social Security Reform, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1287, 1290-91 (2001) ("Social Security is one of the most popular and successful social programs in
this country's history."); Koeninger, supra note 156, at 170 (noting that right to emergency care is an
embedded social norm that no parties to the ACA litigation advocated repealing); Parento, supra note
162, at 697 ("Medicare is popularly considered a right (or, an 'entitlement') for U.S. seniors.").
193. See generally Gary Lawson, Night of the Living Dead Hand: The Individual Mandate and the
Zombie Constitution, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 1699 (2013) (praising some parts of decision and deriding
others); Rosen & Schmidt, supra note 17 (criticizing federalism argument); Strauss, supra note 105
(criticizing Commerce Clause ruling).
194. See Ilya Shapiro, Like Eastwood Talking to a Chair: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of the
Obamacare Ruling, 17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 2-5 (2012) (praising "strong language" in Chief Justice
Roberts's opinion providing limiting principle that implicitly recognizes autonomy interest and rejects
infringement). See generally Purdy & Siegel, supra note 9 (explicitly utilizing Mill's harm principle to
evaluate mandate and NFIB decision).
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power of the Commerce Clause.'" If that is the case, they chose a poor liberty
interest on which to stake their first flag. The conflation of incomplete liberty
and true autonomy creates both practical and conceptual problems that threaten
to undermine the concept of autonomy.
1. Incomplete Liberty Threatens Public/Private Safety Nets
First, the Commerce Clause majority's framework limits the ability to take
incomplete liberty situations into account when revising or expanding social
programs or social insurance.1 96 By treating incomplete liberty as having value
equivalent to other autonomy-based rights such as speech or privacy, and
thereby trumping Congressional power, the NFIB majority may have foreclosed
further public/private safety nets.1 97  Modifications to social programs that
combine public benefits with required private action are often advanced in an
effort to increase autonomy by providing some private choice in tandem with
(or instead of) government-run programs.1 98
Congress has broad power to remove the consequences of choices by
providing safety nets. Importantly, these programs to alleviate harm are
generally politically popular, and it seems safe to assume that a democratically
responsive government will continue to mitigate at least some of the
consequences of poor economic decisions.19 9 Despite the popularity of the
benefits of such programs, there are still those who argue for more individual
choice over the means by which benefits are delivered. 200 If incomplete liberty
over the private portion of these programs is treated with the same reverence as
fully autonomous choices, like they were in NFIB, Congress may be left with
two untenable options for privatization-either allow consequence-free
195. See Barnett, supra note 14, at 1333 (noting that NFIB was a definitive ruling that the Commerce
Clause has limits); Jacobi, supra note 68, at 799 (making strong case that Chief Justice's opinion was a
calculated move to restrain Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause).
196. See Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 18, at 356-65.
197. See id. at 361 (noting that NFIB casts constitutional doubts over any plans to privatize Social
Security).
198. The individual mandate itself was conceived of by a conservative think-tank as a way to do just
that. Rather than reforming healthcare into a single-payer system where the government provides one
health care plan to everyone, the mandate was designed to preserve choice over health insurance plans
while still eliminating the free rider problem created by the willfully uninsured. See id. at 358 (noting
that mandate is alternative to single-payer system); Wriggins, supra note 167, at 286 (describing origins
of mandate).
199. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
200. Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 18, at 360 (discussing benefits of private savings programs,
including "enhanc[ing] personal responsibility for retirement").
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decisions (and the attendant free rider and moral hazard problems) or remove
the safety net so any poor decisions will be met with negative consequences.2 0 '
The only other alternative is to permit no autonomy over the decision at all.
One example of a proposed public/private safety net is the partial
privatization of Social Security. Any privatization plan will necessarily include
a minimum level of required contributions and require some limits on the level
of risk for investments in such accounts or the potential cost of poor decisions
that would need to be ameliorated by welfare payments would overwhelm the
system. 202 Concerns about this cost being used to override the liberty interest in
controlling one's saving decisions should be rejected because the liberty
interest involved in any "savings mandate" would not entail full autonomy. As
discussed, the autonomy involved in a privatization plan that gives individuals
freedom to choose how much to save and where to invest those savings
implicates only incomplete autonomy if there is a safety net that ensures that
the elderly will have at least a minimum standard of living. 203 Given moral
commitments to alleviating extreme poverty among seniors, such a safety net is
inevitable.2 04
If this incomplete liberty is not recognized, however, then the Commerce
Clause majority's reasoning in NFIB would suggest that any savings mandate
would likely be found unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause because it
mandates activity.205 Like the hypothetical "vegetable mandate," the savings
mandate would be susceptible to slippery slope comparisons to fully
autonomous decisions such as the decision to save for a car. This would be the
same mistake the Commerce Clause majority made in NFIB: forbidding
regulations based on incomplete liberty because they offend true autonomy.20 6
201. The latter is unlikely to occur because of our society's moral commitments and the recognition of
imperfect decision making driven by cognitive biases. See infra Part IV.A.
202. See Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 18, at 360 (arguing that contributions to privatized Social
Security accounts would need to be mandatory to be successful in providing universal coverage).
203. See supra p. 121.
204. See Metzger, supra note 15, at 108 (describing "[our] national and collective commitment to
meeting certain basic needs" as a reason behind Social Security's popularity).
205. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text. Relying on the tax power would likely not save a
retirement savings mandate because the amount of "tax" that would be needed to recoup the cost of
someone who failed to save would be the entirety of that person's Social Security payments. This would
greatly exceed the small shared responsibility payment of the ACA. See also Graetz & Mashaw, supra
note 18, at 361 (questioning whether a tax that is equivalent to amount put in savings would pass muster
under NFIB).
206. Such reasoning would mirror the Commerce Clause majority's comparison of purchasing health
insurance to purchasing domestic cars. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2650
(2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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If Congress is not permitted, on liberty grounds, to require individuals to act
when they would prefer inactivity-i.e., save for retirement in a private
account-the only choices are to maintain the current system with no autonomy
over savings and investments or to create an economically unfeasible system
that allows individuals to gamble with their retirement savings and leave the
public to absorb the losses.
Programs that mix public safety nets with private choice demonstrate that
there can be some value in incomplete liberty. Even if society desires a benefit
that removes the most disastrous of consequences, it still may prefer having a
few different paths that can lead to results that might be incrementally better or
worse but never below a basic threshold. Incomplete liberty may be impossible
to deliver as a practical matter, however, if there is no recognition that such
choices should not be valued the same as fully autonomous choices. If those
who ascribe to liberal autonomy fail to recognize this distinction, they lose
potential opportunities to provide increased choice in circumstances where
there is no political will to dismantle the safety net. This increased choice
comes without any additional infringement on true autonomy because the
safety net has already diminished it, so such choices are a valuable compromise
for proponents of libertarian autonomy.
2. Reining in the Ever-Expanding Harm Principle
In addition to hampering autonomy-increasing programs, elevating
incomplete liberty threatens to undermine arguments in favor of genuine
autonomy by expanding the harm principle. There is already great pressure to
expand the harm principle.207 Proponents of regulations often attempt to
characterize arguments based on paternalistic or redistributive goals, such as
preventing social harm, to make such regulations politically or legally
palpable. 208 A theory of robust liberal autonomy requires that much harm
caused by individual experimentation be tolerated. 2 09 But this theory runs up
against those who wish for a more expanded harm principle to address social
ills.
Equating choices that involve incomplete liberty with fully autonomous
207. See Pope, supra note 31, at 445-49 (noting outward pressure on harm principle and that its
misuse can create slippery slope that justifies extensive regulations).
208. Id. at 437 (noting that proponents of regulation use a strategy to "illustrat[e] that seemingly
personal behavior does in fact violate the harm principle and is therefore subject to societal control").
209. MILL, supra note 10, at 69.
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decisions adds additional fodder to those who argue for an expanded harm
principle to account for the negative externalities caused by the lack of
consequences. When consequences are removed from a decision, moral hazard
is often created and free-rider problems can arise.2 10 In addition to the
economic cost of moral hazard, there is an instinctual feeling that it is unjust to
argue that you should have a choice when others pay for the consequences; at a
gut level, we understand that a choice without consequences is less valuable
than truly autonomous decisions.2 11  This idea resonates throughout Justice
Ginsburg's concurrence in NFIB.2 1 2
This sense of moral turpitude leads to a desire to expand the harm principle
to take morality issues into account. Take, for example, Professors Purdy and
Siegel's discussion of the mandate that specifically utilizes Mill's harm
principle. 213 They argue that the harm caused by the free riders who choose not
to purchase health insurance justifies infringement on the autonomy interest
involved because "individual insurance coverage falls squarely into the zone of
interdependence where legal and social judgments inevitably decide which
interests qualify for libertarian protection, rather than into the area of self-
regarding actions where only paternalistic interests are present." 214 They argue
society's commitment to provide health care to those who need it demonstrates
that interdependence relating to health care is a "protected interest[]," making
the harm posed by free riders subject to regulation under the harm principal. 2 15
This injects a form of morality into the autonomy question that depends on
determining what social goods play a sufficiently central role in society.2 16 The
argument that harm to others can be found by the failure to act in alignment
210. See Russell Korobkin, Comparative Effectiveness Research As Choice Architecture: The
Behavior Law and Economics Solution to the Health Care Cost Crisis, 112 MICH. L. REV. 523, 529
(2014) (describing moral hazard problem that arises when costs are borne by a third party, such as
through insurance).
211. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2620 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (noting that the uninsured receive the safety net "for which they do not pay" and that the
insured "bear the cost of this guarantee"); see also Bayer, supra note 151, at 919 ("[T]he uninsured have
no liberty interest in courting awaiting beggardom."); Purdy & Siegel, supra note 9, at 387 (quoting
then-Governor Mitt Romney as remarking that "[a] free ride on the government is not libertarian").
212. See, e.g., Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2611 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (referring to
uninsured as free riders); id. at 2620 (noting that uninsured "receive a benefit for which they do not
pay").
213. See generally Purdy & Siegel, supra note 9.
214. Id. at 386.
215. See id. at 395.
216. See Bayer, supra note 151, at 889-90 (critiquing Professors Purdy and Siegel for relying on
contemporary social morality to justify infringement on liberty).
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with agreed upon social values subverts the purpose of autonomy as a way of
promoting individual choice over required compliance with social norms. 2 17
Although such moral judgments should not play a role in deciding whether
autonomous choices should be allowed, without a way to account for the
difference in the quality of choice this morality is bound to creep in to account
for the lesser value of the consequence-reduced choice.218 In a framework that
makes no distinction between autonomous choices and incomplete liberty, the
only outlet for this sense of unfairness is to expand the harm principle to
encompass the harms caused by limiting the consequences of a choice.
Once the harm principle is expanded with respect to such choices, it is
difficult to rein it in when true autonomy is at stake. As noted by the
Commerce Clause majority, aggregate economic harm poses a particular
concern for the harm principle, given its potentially limitless reach. 21 9 Take
Justice Scalia's concern that the reasoning in Justice Ginsburg's concurrence
regarding the aggregate economic harm of the failure to purchase insurance
could apply to the aggregate effects of individuals' decisions not to purchase
American cars.220 It is easy to see how the harm caused by the failure of the
domestic automobile industry due to aggregate purchasing decisions could
easily outstrip the $1,000 per year cost to society of the uninsured.22 1  If the
liberty interests for both choices are equal, why would the $1,000 per year that
the uninsured cost each American be sufficient to infringe on the choice to
purchase health insurance but not on car selection?
When viewed this way, the Commerce Clause majority's concern about an
unbridled federal power is more understandable. They were correct to be
concerned about using aggregate economic harm to justify infringing on a
protected autonomy interest. 222 Their error lies in finding an autonomy interest
217. The existence of moral hazard does not remove the moral component of this argument as it does
not make a situation universally harmful to society. The purchase of health insurance (or any insurance)
creates moral hazard because individuals have less incentive to avoid the costs covered by insurance.
See Korobkin, supra note 210, at 529. This does not mean that insurance is normatively bad-in the
case of the mandate, it was deemed to be the most socially desirable outcome.
218. See, e.g., Purdy & Siegel, supra note 9, at 382-87.
219. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2588 (2012) (opining that approving
mandate would override all limitation on federal government); id. at 2646 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(allowing mandate would give federal government unlimited power).
220. Id. at 2650.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2589 (Roberts, C.J.) (noting the failure of individuals to "do things that would be good for
them or good for society . .. joined with the similar failures of others [can] readily have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce"). Whether such concern should have led to finding an individual right in
the Commerce Clause that trumps congressional action is a question outside the scope of this Article.
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in the decision to purchase health insurance that is equal to the decision to
purchase a car or any litany of fully autonomous choices.2 23
NFIB might give proponents of a strictly construed harm principle false
hope because a majority of the Court rejected the idea of using aggregate
economic harm to justify the individual mandate.2 24 This outlook is
shortsighted. Most regulations will not benefit from the trump given to the
choice to purchase health insurance in NFIB. First, the concerns about
federalism that justified the opinion do not apply to state regulations.22 5
Second, by focusing on the action/inaction distinction-rather than whether full
autonomy, including consequences, existed-the Court gave Congress the
option of framing most regulations as activity moving forward.22 6 Therefore,
most future regulations evaluated under a framework where incomplete liberty
is at issue will be susceptible to being overridden by an expanded harm
principle. 227 Given the strong pressures to expand the harm principle to address
certain expensive social ills, without the Commerce Clause right as a trump,
many more regulations are likely to succeed under this notion of expanded
harm. Proponents of liberal autonomy may have won the battle in NFIB, but it
could cost them the war.
By focusing on the quality of autonomy inherent in the decision rather than
the harm caused, it becomes significantly easier to find a bright (or at least
brighter) line. Rather than arguing about moral hazard and slippery slopes, this
framework provides a more consistent reason for distinguishing between the
lesser interests involved in the decision to purchase health insurance and the
autonomous decisions to purchase other goods where the government has not
stepped in to modify the consequences of free choice. There is no longer a
223. Saving the mandate under the tax power does not undo the damage done by ignoring the impact
of consequences in the Commerce Clause. As noted, the Chief Justice's opinion conditioned the tax
power on the relatively small size of the shared responsibility payment and the true choice still available
to those who wish not to purchase insurance. Id. at 2595-96. This caps the government's ability to
balance the scales to compensate for the lack of consequences to less than the cost of the insurance itself.
In addition, the tax power is politically difficult to utilize, so the "opinion left Congress with a great deal
of power where it often has the least room to maneuver." Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning,
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius: Five Takes, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 807,
831 (2013).
224. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
225. See Nat'1Fed'n ofIndep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2578; Reynolds & Denning, supra note 223, at 829.
226. See Dorf, supra note 16, at 902-03 (arguing that for most legislation going forward, the
activity/inactivity distinction may not matter as Congress rarely needs to regulate inactivity). Although
a prohibition on mandates may prove problematic in reforming social insurance like Social Security.
See supra Part III.D. 1.
227. See, e.g., Purdy & Siegel, supra note 9, at 386.
822
[Vol. 43: 785, 2016] Considering Consequences
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
need to rely on the activity/inactivity distinction that the Commerce Clause
majority utilized to group the individual mandate together with the hypothetical
vegetable or domestic car mandates.228
This is not to say that the harm principle may never justify infringing on
autonomy. The Commerce Clause certainly grants Congress the power to
regulate commerce based on harm to others.22 9 In addition, Congress and state
governments frequently find sufficient justification for paternalistic
regulations. 23 0 The provision of health care to all, regardless of ability to pay, is
itself a paternalistic measure-infringing on autonomy by removing
consequences. It is there that the justification for the individual mandate can be
found rather than justifying it under the harm principle. 231 By avoiding an
overreliance on the harm principle, the slippery slope is avoided and there is a
clearer argument for why the liberty interest claimed by the Commerce Clause
majority is illusory in the circumstances of the individual mandate. If there is a
substantive due process interest dormant in the Commerce Clause, the
individual mandate should not have called it to the fore.
IV. A BETTER FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING INCOMPLETE LIBERTY
As the previous Part demonstrates, there is an inherent tension between
autonomy-based arguments in favor of economic rights and finding solutions
for the social ills caused by aggregate individual decisions, especially for those
lacking in consequences. This tension makes it crucial to have a framework for
228. In addition, this framework provides a better reason for a limitation on government mandates
than Justice Ginsburg's reliance on the fact that Congress may not pile "inferences upon inferences" to
regulate matters tangentially related to commerce. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2624
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). Although the inferences argument does an adequate job of distinguishing the
individual mandate from a vegetable mandate, it is not as successful against Justice Scalia's concern
about a mandate to buy American cars. Id. at 2588 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2650 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
That regulation would require no inferences to see a meaningful affect on commerce. Id. at 2588
(Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2650 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The more meaningful distinction between the
individual mandate and a buy-American mandate is the free rider problem that Justice Ginsburg
documents. Id. at 2620 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Although Justice Ginsburg focuses on the harm
imposed by free riders, the lack of consequences that alters the nature of the choice is what truly
undermines whatever liberty interest might be inherent in the Commerce Clause. Id. at 2611.
229. See Heart of Atlanta Hotel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964). For example, federal
anti-discrimination laws are meant, at least in part, to prevent the harm caused by racial discrimination.
See Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination Questions and Answers, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPoRTuNrIY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html (last modified Nov. 21, 2009).
230. See Pope, supra note 31, at 477-78 (arguing that much public health law can be justified only by
hard paternalism).
231. See supra Part II.D.1.
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evaluating autonomy-based arguments that takes into account the value of
choices rather than simply aggregating the harm caused. If it is inevitable that
democratic societies will relieve their members of at least some measure of
disastrous consequences, and it seems likely that it is, then such a framework
provides a better way to think about regulations designed to address the
problems created by diminishing the consequences of choices. As America
struggles with how to deal with the cost of the aggregation of poor health
decisions, this framework provides an alternative way of conceiving regulations
that better protects autonomy while still retaining some flexibility for policy
solutions.
A. Mitigation of Some Consequences Is Inevitable
As a threshold matter, given the importance of consequences to autonomy,
some of those who advocate for economic rights on liberty grounds are likely to
argue that the government should stop intervening to prevent the negative
consequences of poor decision making, thereby preserving autonomy.232 Those
who favor this libertarian stance argue that if social safety nets did not exist,
and people were responsible for the consequences of their decisions, people
would make better decisions for themselves.23 3 In other words, without Social
232. This argument is often raised in favor of cutting government benefits in favor of teaching
individuals "personal responsibility." See Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship:
Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 807-08 (2003). The programs
generally attacked using this argument are those that serve vulnerable populations who arguably have
the fewest economic choices. Id. at 809-10 (arguing that limits on benefits further reduces
beneficiaries' bargaining power in the labor or marriage market).
233. See, e.g., Noah Smith, Does the Social Safety Net Make Us Lazy, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Jan. 16,
2015), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-01-26/social-safety-net-business-startups-and-risk-
aversion (quoting then-Vice Presidential Candidate and current Speaker of the House Paul Ryan
describing social safety net as a "hammock that lulls able-bodied people into lives of dependency and
complacency, that drains them of their will and their incentive to make the most of their lives"). Most
politicians who argue for this type of sink or swim approach, however, often temper the potential harsh
outcomes with the promise that private charity will step in and ameliorate the negative consequences
restored by the removal of the government-provided safety net. Id. For example, during a Republican
primary debate in 2001, Congressman Ron Paul was asked whether a healthy man who chose not to
purchase health insurance and falls into a coma should be allowed to die. Sam Stein, GOP Tea Party
Debate: Audience Cheers, Says Society Should Let Uninsured Patient Die, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 12,
2011), http://www.huffngtonpost.com/2011/09/12/tea-party-debate-health-care_n_959354.html.
Congressman Paul blasted the government for intervening in these circumstances, but avoided stating
that the coma patient should be allowed to die. Id. Instead he stated that a private or religious charity
should step in and take care of the man rather than the government. Id. Although Congressman Paul's
argument focused on the idea that individuals should "assume responsibility" for themselves and that
"freedom is all about taking your own risks," id., it is difficult to see how a solution that replaces the
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Security, people would save more; without access to emergency room care,
people would choose to purchase health insurance; without government
bailouts, banks and corporations would not take outsized risks. While the
internal consistency of such an argument in favor of robust autonomy may
resonate with certain theorists and laymen, it is unlikely to occur as a practical
matter in a democratic society.
First, it is now well documented that people do not always make decisions
based on careful determination, and even when they do carefully reflect on their
choices, they frequently come to decisions that are not in line with their own
stated subjective values.2 34 This makes it likely that at least a significant
portion of the population at some time will need, and want, some safety net to
avoid truly disastrous consequences.235 Second, the tension between autonomy
and other values, such as democratic rule and shared moral values, makes
mitigation of especially disastrous consequences inevitable.2 36 Recognizing
that there is a good chance that they will fail to make good decisions, some
people might not wish to use their autonomy if it means facing extremely
severe consequences.2 37
government with private charity, but still ameliorates the worst consequences of the decision, advances
that goal. The substitution only restores the autonomy of the taxpayer, by allowing the taxpayer to
decide how much to give and which recipients are worthy of the charity, but does nothing for the
recipient's autonomy. Id.
234. Professors Sunstein and Thaler summarize research findings related to various cognitive biases
that affect decision making and lead to decisions that do not reflect the actual preferences of individuals,
even when they have full knowledge of risks. CASS R. SUNSTEIN & RICHARD H. THALER, NUDGE 23-37
(2008) [hereinafter NUDGE] (describing various heuristics and biases that lead to deficiencies in the
decision-making process); Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 119, at 1172-79. These biases are most
pronounced when decisions are difficult and rare, when "choices and their consequences are separated in
time, or when feedback from choices is lacking." NUDGE, supra, at 214.
235. See generally SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY, JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM
(2013) (crafting argument against autonomy, including that people would prefer not to be responsible for
decisions that may lead to ruinous circumstances).
236. See supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text. See generally CONLY, supra note 235.
237. See generally CONLY, supra note 235. In addition, studies have shown that people have a "finite
store of mental energy for exerting self-control" and making decisions creates "decision fatigue," which
makes further decisions mentally exhausting and prone to error. John Tierney, Do You Suffer from
Decision Fatigue, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/magazine/
do-you-suffer-from-decision-fatigue.html? r-0; see also Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 119, at 11 1199
(noting that some would prefer not to make hard choices). It might be tempting to argue that individuals
need to exercise their full autonomy by making their own decisions and living with the consequences so
as to avoid arresting their development and infantilizing themselves. See MILL, supra note 10, at 97.
But this argument is a form of paternalism itself-that people must be forced to exercise their autonomy
for their own good in order to better perfect their autonomous decision-making. See CONLY, supra note
235, at 89-90.
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If given the choice between having a choice and living (or dying) with the
consequences or being relieved of the burden of making a complicated choice
or resisting temptation, the majority has chosen the latter in many cases. Social
Security and the requirement that emergency rooms treat everyone regardless
of ability to pay are examples of such popular programs.238 If we value
democratic self-governance, as well as the individual self-governance that
autonomy provides, society should be able to decide to ameliorate those
negative consequences through the democratic process for the protection and
happiness of its members.2 39
This is not to say that the inevitable, or ideal, situation is one in which
every negative consequence is alleviated by the state. Just as a world in which
choices are narrowed by state mandate leads to a society in which new ideas
and new paths of action are stunted by restrictions, so too is a society that lacks
a variety of feedback from untempered consequences.2 40 If we are to value
autonomy, individuals must have great freedom to experiment with their lives
even given humanity's inherent cognitive limitations.241  At the extremes,
however, where poor decisions can lead to unnecessary death or abject poverty,
the reduction of such consequences can be justified for most by paternalistic
arguments. 242
The emergency care safety net is not the first social safety net designed to
ameliorate consequences, nor is it likely to be the last. Outside of concerns
over the individual mandate and the Commerce Clause, a framework to
238. See supra note 192.
239. See CONLY, supra note 235. Even providing an option for full autonomy, with choice and
consequences for individuals who prefer it, does not solve the problem unless society is in fact willing to
let people who have opted for a more autonomous life to suffer or die for preventable reasons due to
their decisions. If not, then autonomy was never actually restored, as the ability to opt into the safety net
when needed is itself the same as alleviating the consequences in the first place. See Nat'l Fed'n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2620 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (acknowledging benefit
of promise of safety net as a good that all receive regardless of use).
240. See MiLL, supra note 10, at 97. In addition, while there are limits to individuals' cognitive
abilities, government is made up of individuals that suffer from the same cognitive limitations, so a lack
of individual autonomy does not totally resolve these issues. See also CONLY, supra note 235, at 26, 28
(arguing individuals cannot think around their biases because they either do not recognize them or think
they do not apply to themselves).
241. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
242. Staunch defenders of libertarian autonomy may never find any paternalistic justifications for
ameliorating consequences sufficient but that view does not appear to be held by the majority. See Pope,
supra note 6, at 666 ("Almost no one disputes the vague proposition that liberty limitation is sometimes
morally justifiable."). The popularity of safety nets that benefit the majority suggests that most are
comfortable with alleviating their own consequences at least in some circumstances. See also Jefferson,
supra note 192, at 1290-91 (describing the popularity of Social Security).
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evaluate autonomy-based arguments against government regulation that
incorporates consequences as part of autonomy is necessary to focus on the
value of autonomy at stake in policy debates regarding social insurance and
safety nets. The remainder of this Part proposes and applies a framework,
proportionalism, to determine what weight should be attributed to autonomy-
based arguments against regulation.
B. Proportionalism
If the alleviation of some consequences is inevitable, a framework is
necessary to evaluate the value of the choice that remains. When consequences
are taken into account, it becomes clear that liberty is not an on/off switch, even
under a theory of liberal autonomy. Some choices have minimal consequences
removed, and thus remain largely autonomous, while others are devoid of a
meaningful level of consequences, making autonomy largely illusory. When
meaningful consequences are removed, regulations that attempt to replicate or
replace the lost deliberative and risk-regulating function of autonomy do not
constitute an independent infringement on liberty.2 43
While regulations can never perfectly replace the role that consequences
play in autonomy, they can be used to encourage deliberation or to replicate the
risk-regulating function of consequences.24 4 Regulations that "rebalance"
autonomy after consequences are removed are justified as restoring the nature
of autonomy itself without reference to the harm principle or paternalistic
arguments. In these situations, arguments against such regulations on
autonomy grounds should be rejected.245 The question becomes, what (if any)
regulations are necessary to restore autonomy? Proportionalism is a framework
for analyzing autonomy-based arguments to answer this question.
First, given the concerns that relational autonomy present regarding the
lack of neutrality in existing social and legal structures, it is necessary to
determine whether the consequences ameliorated result from a fully robust
choice. If the decision maker is overly burdened in her choices, the reduction
or elimination of consequences may be necessary to nurture autonomy.246
For example, Professor Hadfield posits a solution to the problem of women
entering into unfavorable separation agreements immediately following
243. Or at the very least, those who oppose such regulations have a less valid autonomy argument.
244. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
246. See supra Part llI.C.
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divorce.247 There is a concern that women may be influenced by societal
pressure and the cultural role of women to "defer to, or act on the basis of the
interests of, others" to enter into an agreement that does not promote their own
welfare. 248  Rather than limiting choices by not allowing women to mediate
binding settlement agreements, Hadfield suggests limiting the duration of these
agreements and requiring renegotiation after a few years.249 After that time,
"we might expect that the emotional difficulties that distort women's exercise
of autonomy in the agreement will have subsided somewhat and women will
have gained a greater sense of their autonomy from their ex-husbands." 25 0 This
model proposes to foster autonomy and protect women's ability to make self-
determining choices by limiting some of the consequences of their decisions.25 1
In these circumstances, autonomy-based arguments opposing regulations of
choice would continue to be valid despite the lack of consequences. Regulating
choice would defeat the purpose of minimizing consequences in order to allow
space for risk-taking to build autonomous capacity.2 52
As noted, ardent libertarians are unlikely to agree with theories of
relational autonomy and would likely skip this first step.253 Most would agree
that there is some line, however, where "choice" is so meaningless given an
individual's circumstances that the removal of consequences is necessary on
fairness or moral agency grounds-for example, developmentally disabled
individuals or children.2 54 For those individuals, removing consequences
provides space for lower-risk choices that increase autonomy rather than
diminish it.
Proportionalism has the most to say in the second step when the decision
maker does have sufficient choice. The second step is to determine whether the
consequences of that choice have been removed by state action. If they have,
247. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Dilemma of Choice: A Feminist Perspective on the Limits ofFreedom of
Contract, 33 OSGOOD HALL L.J. 337, 346 (1995).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 349.
250. Id. at 349-50.
251. See id.
252. See supra notes 175-85 and accompanying text. For example, the provisions of the ACA
designed to provide health insurance to those who cannot afford it enhance the autonomy of recipients
by ensuring they remain healthy enough to live a more autonomous life. Bayer, supra note 151, at 914.
The benefits they receive are defined by statute, but there is no need to further regulate their health
insurance decisions in the name of balancing the scales.
253. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
254. Even Mill argued that children and "barbarians" lacked the capacity for autonomy. See MILL,
supra note 10, at 8.
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regulations are justifiable without resort to paternalism or the harm principle. 2 55
Regulations are justified to the extent that they are needed to balance the
negative effects of removing consequences. A balance should be struck by
considering what portion of the consequences of the decision is still felt by
individuals compared to the consequences removed. Because the goal is to
replicate or replace the removed consequences, regulations should replace only
that portion of the consequences that the safety net alleviates. By looking at the
role consequences are meant to play in balancing the scales, it is possible to
craft regulations that are proportional to the consequences that are
ameliorated.2 56
Proportionalism values autonomy more accurately than looking at the
aggregate cost to society to remove the consequences. Autonomy requires that
most indirect harm caused by individual choice be absorbed by society. 25 7 It is
more respectful of autonomy to consider the recipient's autonomy in the
decision-making process rather than thinking about autonomy solely in terms of
the diffused burden to the taxpayer.2 58
In addition, regulations based on the cost to society ignore the reasoning
behind trying to replicate the lost consequences. 25 9 The fact that a consequence
is expensive to mitigate divulges nothing about whether other consequences to
that choice exist and are sufficient to reliably regulate risk and inform choices.
Focusing on consequences avoids the overvaluation of incomplete liberty that
might hamper efforts to replace consequences to avoid moral hazard. At the
same time, it prevents aggregate economic harm from justifying massive
infringement on liberty that is still largely intact due to the deliberative and
risk-regulating benefits of the remaining consequences.260
255. This Article takes no position on policy arguments regarding the validity of regulations that
infringe on true autonomy. Regulations intended to replace the missing consequences are meant to
restore autonomy, but autonomy is not an absolute right and once restored may be limited in most cases
on other grounds.
256. One could argue that if taking away consequences diminishes autonomy, then the solution to
restrict choices further diminishes autonomy unnecessarily. But choices unbalanced by consequences
not only lose the intrinsic benefit to the individual but also the benefits to society. See supra Part III.A.
In addition, regulations on choice in these circumstances are justified by a waiver of autonomy by those
receiving the benefit. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
257. See MILL, supra note 10, at 69. Focusing on the harm caused by the safety net is appropriate
only when justifying regulations based on the harm principle, which is arguably not appropriate for
aggregate economic harm caused by completely autonomous decisions.
258. This is especially true given the broad tax power of the government and the limited autonomy
right to avoid paying taxes. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
259. See supra pp. 143-44.
260. See supra Part JI.A.
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C. Applying Proportionalism: Health Choices
Proportionalism is a guiding principle rather than an exact science because
consequences can be difficult to measure and their importance will vary
between individuals. This section will apply the framework to health-related
policy issues to better explore its application.
1. When Most Significant Consequences Are Removed
An autonomy argument that involves only individuals with robust choice
and most (or all) of the consequences of that choice removed is the easiest to
evaluate. The proportionality of requiring a particular financial choice in
exchange for being relieved of the worst of the financial consequences of that
decision is relatively straightforward. As argued above, the individual mandate
falls under this category of choices, calling into question the validity of
autonomy-based arguments regarding the freedom not to purchase insurance.2 6 1
Taking consequences into account, the majority of the Court in NFIB
would be hard-pressed to find a liberty interest worthy of their novel use of
federalism. As noted, the individual mandate applies only to individuals who
can afford health insurance; 262 thus, the first step is satisfied. For covered
individuals, the most damaging consequences of the failure to purchase health
insurance were already mitigated by the safety net because catastrophic care is
provided.263 There are still some consequences of failing to purchase insurance
that remain, as the safety net does not provide comprehensive coverage.26 4 In
addition, while care is provided regardless of ability to pay, if a provider
decides to pursue the patient for payment, discharging medical debts in
bankruptcy has its own set of negative consequences.26 ' Despite these
consequences, the alternative-the refusal of care in painful or life-threatening
situations-is far worse.
If Congress had the authority to remove the consequences of the failure to
purchase health insurance, it should have the authority to mandate the choice to
261. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
263. See supra Part ILI.B.
264. Although those covered by the mandate, i.e., those who could afford to purchase insurance but
choose not to, may not feel the full brunt of the negative consequences of lacking health insurance
because their income is likely sufficient to purchase some preventable care. This is unlike those who are
uninsured due to poverty and not choice.
265. See Porter & Thorne, supra note 136, at 83-93 (detailing negative effects after bankruptcy).
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purchase health insurance.26 6 This argument can be made under the Commerce
Clause as a matter of economics and market forces.267 But it is also a valid
argument against finding an economic right backed by a liberty interest. The
"liberty" at issue is incomplete in a meaningful way, and regulations are
appropriate to replicate the function of the consequences removed.
Critics of the ACA could argue that the mandate is not proportional
because it goes beyond replicating consequences because the insurance
mandated exceeds the "insurance" provided under the social safety net. The
minimum plans under the Affordable Care Act provide many of the bells and
whistles coverage that the safety net lacks, such as mental health coverage and
certain preventative care.2 68 In other words, while there is no valid autonomy
argument against a mandate to purchase catastrophic health insurance, there
may be an autonomy argument for the right to decide between catastrophic
coverage and the minimum plan under the ACA. This may be a valid policy
argument, but it would be difficult to make as a constitutional matter. It is hard
to see how it would rise to the level of a new economic right under the
Commerce Clause, or would not, at the very least, be authorized under the
Necessary and Proper Clause.2 69
2. When Significant Consequences Remain
Situations where the consequences removed by government action are only
a fraction of the consequences of a particular decision are more complicated to
address. The Chief Justice's concern about the cost of poor health decisions
provides a helpful example.270 As he noted, the rising cost of health care for
individuals who make poor health decisions puts an even greater strain on the
health care system than the cost of the uninsured.2 7 ' While the Chief Justice's
266. See Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2619-20 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
267. See id. (making economic argument for mandate).
268. See Barry Cushman, NFIB v. Sebelius and the Transformation of the Taxing Power, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 133, 192 (2013); see also Parento, supra note 162, at 693 (describing essential health
benefits package required under the ACA). Parento notes that a new Health and Human Services (HHS)
bulletin announced that the agency intends to permit states to determine the minimum insurance package
within the statutory guidelines, so states may have varying comprehensive minimum plans. Id. at 694.
269. See id. (describing breadth of Necessary and Proper power before NFIB).
270. Nat'lFed'n ofIndep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2588.
271. Id. There is some debate over the actual cost of obesity and the role of personal responsibility
for health-related decisions. See Colin Hector, Nudging Towards Nutrition? Soft Paternalism and
Obesity-Related Reform, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 103, 104-08 (2012) (describing debate). This Article
will assume the Chief Justice's position for the sake of the argument.
831
[Vol. 43: 785, 2016] Considering Consequences
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
argument that Congress might attempt to address this problem by passing a
"vegetable mandate" is probably not a realistic concern, commentators have
proposed regulations, and some have been implemented, in an attempt to
address the problem of America's expanding waistline and declining health.2 72
Many of these regulations have been opposed on autonomy grounds. 3
If health decisions were fully autonomous, then the relevant question
would be whether the cost of obesity or poor health is sufficient harm to society
to trigger the harm principle.27 4 If the harm principle is satisfied, then
comprehensive health regulations should be permitted to avoid that harm; if
not, then no regulations are acceptable without resort to paternalistic
justifications.27 5 Many of the arguments in favor of the regulation of health
choices focus on the aggregate economic cost of poor health decisions to
support a harm-based argument in favor of regulation.276 As discussed, that
reasoning mistakes the nature of the inquiry by focusing the autonomy
argument on the diffused cost to society rather than the quality of the choice.27 7
Under a framework of autonomy that gives consequences their due, the
focus is on the decision maker's autonomy-both choices and consequences-
rather than on the taxpayers' purse. In examining consequences, it is clear that
some consequences of poor health decisions are limited, specifically many of
the financial consequences. Under the ACA, insurance companies are required
to accept all applicants regardless of pre-existing conditions, including those
brought on by poor health decisions, and are prohibited from charging rates
based on an individual's health, thus spreading the cost of poor health to all
insured individuals. 278  These provisions, therefore, remove much of the
272. See McGuinness, supra note 56, at 48-49 (listing potential regulations including nutritional
labeling, restrictions on advertising unhealthy food, a "fat tax" on unhealthy food, and banning certain
foods); Hector, supra note 271, at 118-19 (proposing "soft paternalism" regulations such as clear
labeling and changing defaults such as portion size).
273. See McGuinness, supra note 56, at 50 (citing arguments against intervention to combat obesity,
which hold "that the cost of obesity must be borne by the individual for the greater good of individual
freedom"); see also Hector, supra note 271, at 119-20 (noting that soft paternalism, while it is
considered not to infringe on autonomy, has been criticized as being insufficient to affect real change).
274. This dichotomy presumes a strict view of liberal autonomy where paternalistic justifications for
health regulations would be rejected.
275. The Commerce Clause majority rejected the idea of the individual mandate as a penalty because
of a concern that it opened the door for such regulations. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
276. See McGuinness, supra note 56, at 56 (arguing that cost of treatment for obesity justifies "fat
tax" under harm principle); Pope, supra note 31, at 442-43 (arguing that cost to society of smoking
justifies regulations under harm principle).
277. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text (discussing guaranteed-issue and community-
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financial strain of poor health that would be caused by denial of coverage or
increased insurance premiums. In addition, healthcare is provided to all
senior citizens through Medicare, effectively passing on the cost of the
culmination of a lifetime of health decisions onto the taxpayer. 280 Does this
justify comprehensive regulations regarding decisions about health and diet?
From the standpoint of the healthy insured and the taxpayer, it could seem
reasonable to place conditions on any health decisions that will increase the
price tag of that care.
Proportionalism would counsel a more nuanced approach that better
respects the autonomy of decision makers. 281' Although the financial impact of
poor health is lessened by existing policies, there are more consequences to
health decisions than the cost of healthcare. Someone who makes poor health
decisions during her lifetime, be it smoking, overeating, or failing to exercise,
is likely to suffer many consequences far more severe than the financial cost of
care.28 2  Obesity alone has been linked to type-2 diabetes, coronary heart
disease, hypertension, stroke, cancer, depression, anxiety, suicidal tendencies,
and premature death.283 While the cost of treating preventable illnesses related
to poor health decisions is undoubtedly a daunting prospect, the potential of
pain, illness, impaired mobility and lifestyle, and premature death are
consequences that cannot be alleviated.2 84 Therefore, regulations need not take
over all the work that consequences would supply absent government
involvement.
By cabining regulations in such a way, the deliberative and
experimentation value of autonomy is preserved. Individuals still retain most
of the freedom to consider where health fits into their concept of the good and
make decisions that they expect will lead to a life they find most fulfilling.
Those choices may lead to consequences they did not intend and do not want,
rating provisions).
279. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2645 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(describing how the guaranteed-issue and community-pricing provisions pass the costs of those with
high actuarial risks onto healthy individuals with low actuarial risks).
280. Kelli K. Garcia, The Fat Fight: The Risks and Consequences of the Federal Government's
Failing Public Health Campaign, 112 PENN ST. L. REv. 529, 557 (2007) (reporting CDC findings that
approximately half of the $100 billion cost of obesity is covered by Medicare and Medicaid).
281. See supra Part IV.B.
282. See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 280, at 557 (describing negative health consequences of obesity and
lack of exercise).
283. McGuinness, supra note 56, at 45.
284. See Parento, supra note 162, at 702 (noting that damage to health caused by poor health choices
"can only be partially undone by modifications later in life").
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which they can then incorporate when charting a new course. They can see the
consequences that flow from others' health decisions and incorporate that
feedback. 28 5  In addition, the risk-regulating function of autonomy is still
largely present because there are still significant negative consequences to
counsel against poor health decisions.286
Finding the correct balance of limited regulations to replace the lost
financial consequences will not be an exact science, nor is there likely to be a
universal formula in such complicated cases. Just as people have different
notions of what constitutes pursuit of the good, individuals will place different
value on various consequences. A dedicated athlete who gains immense
pleasure from running marathons may consider a lack of mobility caused by
dietary choices to be a truly disastrous consequence, while a less active person
might not place much value on it. A single person without children might not
be particularly concerned with the cost of end of life treatment for lung cancer,
while a husband and father might consider leaving his family destitute a
consequence that must be avoided at all costs. 287
This is not to say that all (or even most) individuals will make healthy
choices with consequences restored. A large measure of autonomy over health
decisions means that people will be free to fail-to live unhealthy lives and live
(or die) with the consequences. Autonomy-restoring regulations should not be
designed to punish or ensure uniform outcomes but rather to replace or
replicate the informative and risk-regulating function that the removed
consequences would have played in individuals' decision making.
Policy prescriptions on proper health regulations to strike that balance are
well outside the scope of this Article, and certainly, people will disagree where
that balance should be struck. However, a framework that focuses on the
consequences rather than aggregate economic harm provides a good starting
point. After autonomy is restored, only then must regulations lead to debates
over the proper limit of the harm principle or paternalistic justifications.
285. Learning from consequences experienced by others helps us avoid those same consequences in
the future. See Stephen D. Easton & Julie A. Oseid, "And Bad Mistakes? I've Made a Few ": Sharing
Mistakes to Mentor New Lawyers, 77 ALB. L. REV. 499, 512-13 (2013) (recognizing that sharing
mistakes with others helps them learn from your experience, and that embracing and sharing those
consequences is beneficial for both parties); see also; Fallon, supra note 44, at 887-88.
286. See supra Part ILI.A.
287. To use an example from popular culture, in the television program "Breaking Bad," a father
diagnosed with inoperable lung cancer becomes a methamphetamine producer and distributer to pay for
treatment and secure his family's financial future.
834
[Vol. 43: 785, 2016] Considering Consequences
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that thinking about consequences as an
integral part of autonomy is a better approach for policymakers and courts
when evaluating choices whose consequences have been ameliorated by the
provision of a social safety net ex post. By identifying when claims to
autonomy are undermined by the lack of consequences, we can avoid the false
conflicts created by requiring justifications, such as the harm principle, for
infringements on incomplete liberty.
These false "autonomy versus harm" arguments lead to two potential bad
outcomes: First, decisions involving incomplete liberty can be overvalued as
true autonomy, and the state may be unable to utilize justifiable regulations to
appropriately regulate choice to account for the diminished autonomy and the
social harms caused by removing consequences. 288 This threatens the viability
of social safety nets because it prevents the government from disincentivizing
free riders by restoring a proportional level of consequences. 28 9 Alternatively,
true autonomy may be undervalued if attempts to regulate choices involving
incomplete liberty are accepted by expanding the harm principle unnecessarily
to incorporate diffused aggregate economic harm.290  Expanding the harm
principle without distinguishing between harms created by consequence-
reduced choices and those created by autonomous choices could undermine
autonomy by applying the expanded harm to the regulation of fully autonomous
choices.
Considering consequences when appropriate and applying proportionalism
to determine what regulations are justified to restore the portion of
consequences removed by the safety net provides a better framework. 2 9 1 It
avoids overreliance on the harm principle and provides a way to address
situations where only some of the consequences of a decision are removed,
while retaining sufficient respect for the autonomy that remains.
This framework is useful in a variety of contexts. The role of
consequences should be considered any time an autonomy-based argument is
advanced to challenge a regulation. As the pressure increases to expand
"economic liberty," the ability to correctly identify issues of incomplete liberty
288. See supra notes 65-104 and accompanying text (discussing Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)).
289. See Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 18, at 361 (questioning whether Congress will have the
flexibility to adopt reforms to existing safety nets after NFIB).
290. See Pope, supra note 31, at 449 (discussing the danger of expanding the harm principle).
291. See supra Part IV.B-.C.
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will become more important. The framework is also relevant in evaluating
arguments to increase autonomy in relation to social insurance programs by
providing private choice in tandem with public benefits. Even claims of
autonomy-based rights held by corporations could be suspect given the limited
liability that corporate shareholders enjoy.29 2
In addition, recognizing up front that programs to mitigate consequences
open the door to related regulations can avoid an outcry over unpopular
regulations that are imposed long after generally popular safety nets are
accepted.293  This allows legislatures and their constituents to negotiate the
tradeoffs between autonomy and safety nets. For example, the movement to
allow discharge of student loans in bankruptcy arguably invokes this
framework.294 Stakeholders should come to an agreement as to the value of
being relieved of student loan debt through bankruptcy in relation to the other
consequences of potentially ill-advised educational decisions and what
regulations on student choices are acceptable. By passing a complete system
that makes the connection between safety nets and limited choices explicit,
rather than patchwork legislation, situations like the furor over the individual
mandate may be avoided.
292. I intend to further explore this issue in future work.
293. See supra Part IV.A.
294. There may be concerns about the level of autonomy young people have under a relational
autonomy model if they are unable to finance their educations without crippling debt. See supra Part
III.C. Arguably, allowing for bankruptcy may be a way to increase the autonomy of less economically
privileged students by providing an education to nurture future autonomy while limiting the attendant
risk of debt.
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